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Abstract
Regulatory Independence and the Development of the Telecommunications Sector in The
English-Speaking Caribbean
by
Delreo A. Newman

MA, Fordham University, 1987
BS, New York Institute of Technology, 1986

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy and Administration

Abstract
Small developing states can use proper regulatory frameworks in policy and sector
development to implement efficiency and consumer safeguards to the sector. However,
sufficient research on the impact of telecommunications regulatory institutions on micro
economies has not been conducted. Capture theory was used as the theoretical lens for
this thesis. In doing so, a quantitative analysis was done using, cross-sectional pooled
time series to determine how an independent telecommunications regulator impacted the
telecommunications sector in the English-speaking Caribbean. All the data acquired for
analysis were secondary yearly data collected from the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) from 1993 to 2012. Specifically, this study examined how prices,
investment, infrastructure, and competition in the telecoms sector are affected by the type
of regulatory regime (independent or non independent ) for fixed line and mobile
services. Results indicate that the type of regulatory regime has a statistically significant
impact on fixed line services and price of the telecommunications sector (p < .0001).
However, this regulation was absent in other areas such as cellular services, broadband
usage, telecoms investment and competition. The potential for positive social change is
tied to recommendations specific to developing countries to ensure their regulators have
autonomy in making decisions regarding the volume, quality and costs of
telecommunications services. Legislation must minimize any overlap in the roles of
policy makers, legislators, administrators and regulators to ensure that the regulatory
framework addresses the particulars conditions of the country in which it operates.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
All modern economies are based on the backbone of information and
communication technologies (ICTs), which is sometimes used interchangeably with the
term telecommunications. For developing countries, there is a link between economic
growth and living standards and the use of ICTs by those countries (Garbacz &
Thompson, 2007). To optimize the benefits of using ICTs, the World Bank and other
similar institutions have advocated that ICTs should be regulated. The International
Telecommunications Union (ITU, 2014) stated, “[e]ffective regulation has proven to
result in greater economic growth, increased investment, lower prices, better quality of
service, higher penetration, and more rapid technological innovation in the sector” (p.
6.2.4). However, effective regulation means having an institution or a body that is not
only independent of the sector it regulates, but is also independent of policy creation
(Intven, Oliver, & Sepulveda, 2000). In this quantitative study, I examined the effects of
the two types of telecommunications regulatory frameworks: those that are independent
from policy creation and policy creators and those that are not. I examined the
significance of these regulatory frameworks on economic growth by using a pooled,
cross-sectional time series analysis.
Background
The Caribbean is an archipelago of islands south of the North American
continent. Its history and cultural identity are more closely related to the Europeans who
exerted control during the colonial period than to the North Americans who live in close
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proximity to it. The type of regulatory framework that is created in these countries stands
in contrast to North American regulatory institutions. Daintith indicated that both a
“cultural and constitutional context” is important to explain the difference in regulatory
frameworks (as cited in Ogus, 2002, p. 2). In addition, British jurisprudence is different
from U.S. jurisprudence (White, 1976). The U.S. experience, which included the
American Revolution, resulted in beliefs that “the law and legal institutions that were
unique rather than derivative” (Ogus, 2002, p. 1212). The countries and dependencies
that comprise the English-speaking Caribbean (either formerly of the British Empire or
still territories of the United Kingdom) are as follows: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica,
Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos (Meditz & Hanratty, 1989).
When people think of the Caribbean, they usually think of the islands that are in the
Caribbean Sea; however, the Caribbean is more than just those islands (Payne, 1995).
The Caribbean also includes Guyana in South America and Belize, which is in Central
America. Bermuda, although not located in the Caribbean Sea, is also considered part of
the Caribbean, or a part of the British West Indies.
For many years, the primary economic activity for the majority of the Englishspeaking Caribbean has been agriculture, and over the past decade and a half, services
(i.e., financial, tourism, etc.) have become a contributor to the economy (Beckford &
Campbell, 2013). In 1998, throughout the Caribbean, there was a movement to reform the
telecommunications sector. Similar to American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) in the
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United States, within the English-speaking Caribbean, the telecommunications
monopolies responded negatively to the call for reform, often referred to as liberalization.
The industry’s reform would not be driven by internal forces in the Caribbean countries.
Instead, reform was driven by external bodies, such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and by technological advances that were outside the span of control of the
incumbent telephone companies and the local laws. Despite the lack of pressure from
internal forces, the telecommunications monopolies were entrenched within these
English-speaking Caribbean societies that telecommunications companies were still able
to exert enough pressure on lawmakers to make policy change in telecommunications
difficult to pass without the lawmakers consulting these companies (Stirton & Lodge,
2002).
Before the privatization efforts of the 1980s, the telephone companies in these
Caribbean countries were government-owned, and they were, therefore, at first selfregulated. After the governments initially privatized the telephone companies, the
companies continued to be self-regulated. The governments lacked the human capacity
for regulating the industry. Cable &Wireless, a transnational British company, purchased
most of the governments’ telephone interests throughout most of the English-speaking
Caribbean; Guyana, Belize, and the Bahamas were the only exceptions.
In 1989, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM, 2013)
heads of government established the Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU). Until
this time, the role the governments played was limited to the price and availability of
telephone services throughout the countries. In the mid-1990s, their interests soon
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encompassed the broader telecommunications services. The formation of the CTU was
driven by changes in telecommunications that began in the rest of the world. The
Caribbean countries’ political interests in telecommunications reform were driven by the
desire to develop the ICT sector, but were also largely motivated by the desire to protect
the agricultural base. Wanting continued access to worldwide markets, especially those of
Europe where concessions were made for the banana and sugar industries, government
officials opened trade in the ICT sector to continue protection for agriculture (Kwa, 1999;
Raworth, 2005).
Competition is commonplace in the telecommunications sector. Spulber
suggested that “economic textbooks have held up the telecommunications industry as the
ideal model of a natural monopoly” (as cited in Thierer, 1994, p. 268). A natural
monopoly occurs whenever “a single firm is able to control most, if not all, output and
prices in each market due to the enormous entry barriers and economies of scale
associated with the industry” (Thierer, 1994, p. 268). Telecommunications was
considered a natural monopoly because of the cost associated with offering services, such
as laying cables and building switching stations (Thierer, 1994, p. 268). Only
governments or multinational firms that sought high rates of returns could afford the high
cost of construction of networks, and they only built and expanded networks in what they
perceived as the most economically viable areas.
The policymakers (political directorate) had the task of implementing a new
competitive telecommunications sector. As Spiller and Sampson (1994) indicated, these
policymakers, who initially privatized monopoly telecommunications companies because
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they thought that having a private monopoly would be beneficial for their countries’
economies, were faced with a monopolistic entity that wanted super profits with
continuous price adjustments and limited oversight (p. 44). Caribbean policymakers did
not introduce a change that would offer competition to the telecommunications sector.
The movement from a monopolistic telecommunications environment to a
competitive market in the English-speaking Caribbean was not uniform. Government
ministers throughout CARICOM formed a telecommunications body, the CTU, and this
entity operated similar to ITU within the United Nations. The Treaty of Chaguaramas
allowed for the formation of the CTU (2017). Although this treaty was intended to deal
primarily with trade issues, the CARICOM created a body to deal with
telecommunications even before the WTO was created. From the beginning, the CTU had
limited powers in its ability to influence the policies of the countries it was designed to
assist. The treaty was only ratified and accepted over a decade later (CARICOM, 2017).
Ministers responsible for the telecommunications portfolio did not abide by the CTU’s
recommendations until 1999, when the possibility of a new telecommunications
paradigm arose. St. Lucia’s telecommunications monopoly license came to an end, and
the WTO began using the CTU as a conduit for information. When the WTO partnered
with the CTU, it brought the issues that the CTU was already advocating to the various
Caribbean countries, and the governments were able to present a more unified and
uniformed approach in their discussions with the incumbent providers of
telecommunications.
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St. Lucia’s negotiations with its telecommunications monopoly provider was
critical to the success of the whole region, because when St. Lucia’s domestic license
officially ended in September 2000, the St. Lucian government only extended it to March
2001 (Anthony, 2010). The St. Lucian government granted an extension for only 1 year
to indicate to the monopolist provider, Cable &Wireless, that St. Lucia would not
negotiate unless Cable &Wireless was also willing to negotiate simultaneously with the
other English-speaking Caribbean countries. At the time, Cable & Wireless controlled
telecommunications in nearly all of the English-speaking Caribbean with exclusivity
licenses, with the exception of Belize, the Bahamas, and Guyana.
While Cable &Wireless was negotiating with the other islands, Marpin, a small
provider in Dominica, decided to challenge that monopoly. Marpin “sought declaratory
and other relief sunder the Fundamentals Rights Provision of the Constitution of
Dominica” and “The High Court and later the Court of Appeal, agreed with Marpin that
the exclusivity conferred by the licenses secured by Cable & Wireless was [indeed] in
contravention of the Constitution” (Anthony, 2010, p. 8). Marpin’s win meant that
although Cable & Wireless had an exclusive license in place, communication was a right
of any human being, and an exclusive license was unlawful and unenforceable.
From a regulatory perspective, Baldwin and Cave (1999) stated, “[r]egulation
can be seen to be centrally concerned with the control of risks” (p. 138). St. Lucia
attempted to minimize Cable & Wireless’s impact on the country by including other
countries in its negotiation. Cable & Wireless agreed to simultaneously negotiate with all
the countries. The political risks associated with this new paradigm of moving away from
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negotiating alone were minimized for St. Lucia and the rest of the Caribbean. The
countries all agreed that a collective approach was the best strategy for bargaining with
telecommunications providers.
Jamaica believed in the collective approach, but was further along than the rest
of the Caribbean in the liberalization of the telecommunications sector; it had passed the
necessary laws to establish an independent utilities regulator, the Office of Utilities
Regulation (OUR). Other English-speaking Caribbean nations, as well as St. Lucia, were
yet to establish or create terms of engagement (for negotiation) with the incumbent that
had only agreed to the negotiated collective process in principle. Although all of these
Caribbean countries are formally tied to CARICOM (which deals with these collective
issues as a single entity), there was a degree of rivalry that existed between the countries.
Jamaica, having the largest population, believed that it should lead the way in terms of
negotiating with Cable & Wireless, and so began bilateral negotiations. If the
negotiations proved unsuccessful, then Jamaica would join the collective negotiations
with the other countries as a last resort.
Baldwin and Cave (1999) discussed the “regulatory challenges or risks” that
needed to be minimized as a matter of priority if they are to meet “public approval” (p.
142). If the people of St. Lucia approved St. Lucia’s plan, no government that opposed
the plan would have been willing to complain, because several other Eastern Caribbean
countries had joined the collective bargaining. As Anthony (2010) indicated, Cable &
Wireless “[was] the most hated company operating in St. Lucia,” and this was equally
true in the other Caribbean countries where they operated (p. 8). Jamaica believed that the
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public would consider the breaking of Cable & Wireless’s exclusivity, which extended to
the year 2038. Public opinion is classified as a “noneconomic consideration,” and Kahn
(1993) believed that “noneconomic considerations” are critical in making regulatory
decisions and that “noneconomic considerations intrude” even when proper market and
economic efficiency can be made (p. 189). For years, the costs of maintaining the
monopoly did not matter to these Caribbean countries, as they believed they were
obligated to honor the exclusive contract. According to Kahn, the idea of “social or
political objectives” is oftentimes “brought to bear on public [decisions] and often
involve, explicitly or implicitly, a purely economic judgment that the private market
provides insufficient consumption because the external benefits are large” (p. 190). Kahn
recognized that the politics intrude or even override proper economic principles. Hence,
the plan by the minister in Jamaica to be the first Caribbean country to have bilateral
negotiations with the incumbent while maintaining an alternative plan was a social
objective in which there were external benefits. In addition, the minister knew he would
have the support of the public and constituents. Reform of the telecommunications sector
then became easier for the other governments.
Telecommunications reform would have been easier to achieve by the Caribbean
policy makers. However, small island developing states (SIDS) are not studied as much,
and it has been observed that the requirements for growth are different from larger
countries. This study added to the body of knowledge and filled the gap in the existing
literature as to the role that independent telecommunications regulator plays in the
economy of SIDS of the English-speaking Caribbean.
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Problem Statement
The WTO governs the trade agreements that various countries create. The WTO
(2014) stated that a country must form a “regulatory body [that] is separate from, and not
accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services” (p. 5). On the other
hand, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose
members are developed countries, promoted the idea that more effective regulation could
be obtained with less “political interference” through “structural independence” by
having independent regulators (Min, 2000, p. 4). Both organizations believe that
telecommunications regulatory bodies should be autonomous in a way that is similar to
those of developed countries, such as the United States, which has the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). However, in many Caribbean nations, any change
in the political administration does not include an automatic change in the leadership of
regulatory institutions. This lack of change in the regulatory body while political
administrations change causes tension between the two entities. Additionally, not all
countries of the Commonwealth created independent regulatory bodies (see Table 1); for
example, the governments of Antigua and Barbuda and Bermuda have control of their
telecommunications sector (ITU, 2004; Ministry of the Environment,
Telecommunications & E-commerce, 2007).
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Table 1
List of Caribbean Countries, the Type and Name of their Regulatory Body or Bodies, and their Creation Dates

Country

Anguilla
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize

Type of Telecommunications
Regulatory Framework

Agency Name

Date Created by
Legislative Fiat

Independent
Dependent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Dependent/Independent

Public Utilities Commission
Ministry of Telecommunications
Utilities Regulation Competition Authority
Fair Trading Commission
Public Utilities Commission
Department of Telecommunications/
Bermuda Telecommunication Regulatory
Authority
Telecommunications Regulatory
Commission
Information & Communication Technology
Authority
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications
Authority (ECTEL)/ National
Telecommunications Regulatory
Commission (NTRC)
Public Utilities Commission
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications
Authority (ECTEL)/ National
Telecommunications Regulatory
Commission (NTRC)
Office of Utilities Regulation
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications
Authority (ECTEL)/ National
Telecommunications Regulatory
Commission (NTRC)
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications
Authority (ECTEL)/ National
Telecommunications Regulatory
Commission (NTRC)
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications
Authority (ECTEL)/ National
Telecommunications Regulatory
Commission (NTRC)
Montserrat Info-Communications Authority
Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad
and Tobago
Turks and Caicos Islands
Telecommunications Commission

2003
1951
2009
2002
2001
1986/2011

Bermuda
British Virgin
Islands
Cayman Islands

Independent

Dominica

Independent

Guyana
Grenada

Independent
Independent

Jamaica
St. Kitts &Nevis

Independent
Independent

St. Lucia

Independent

St. Vincent & the
Grenadines

Independent

Montserrat
Trinidad & Tobago

Independent
Independent

Turks & Caicos
Islands

Independent

Independent

2006
2011
2000

1999
2000

1997
2000

2000

2000

2009
2001
2004
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The Caribbean countries that created independent regulators adopted the stance
that independence meant autonomy in terms of WTO regulations. The idea of autonomy
for regulatory bodies came from the OECD countries and institutions such as the World
Bank, the International Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
to minimize governments’ expediency. Those institutions pushed the idea onto various
nations (Cόrdova-Novion & Hanlon, 2002; Intven et al., 2000). Although the WTO did
not include the Commonwealth Caribbean within its trading framework, they were
included incidentally because the United Nations views Latin American and Caribbean
countries as one entity (United Nations, 2013).
Developing countries are generally categorized by international agencies as only
having varying degrees of poverty. As Torres (as cited in Courtright, 2004) explained that
although international agencies view developing countries as unique, they consider the
countries as “homogenized by poverty,” with variations only existing in the size of the
problem (p. 352). International agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF,
recommended that the Caribbean countries create the same regulatory institutional
framework, namely a policy allowing for an independent telecommunications regulator,
just as larger countries have. These external institutions neglected to perform a costbenefit analysis to determine the value of these independent telecommunications
regulatory institutions to each respective small economy. The WTO recognizes that small
economies are different than larger ones and are, therefore, at a disadvantage by certain
rules, such as having to implement telecommunications reform (Moore, 2001). Little is
known about the impact that an independent telecommunications regulatory framework
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or independent telecommunications regulator has on a small developing state in the
English-speaking Caribbean (Symeou & Pollit, 2007; Sutherland, 2009). Scholars have
primarily focused on larger, industrial or developing economies, and the positive impact
the telecommunications regulatory institutions have on those economies. Sufficient
research on the impact of telecommunications regulatory institutions on smaller
economies has not been conducted. Therefore, this dissertation filled the gap that existed
in the literature about the impact of independent telecommunications regulatory
institutions on small economies, recognizing that such economies may have differing
developmental national policies than their larger counterparts.
Purpose
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the effects of the two
differing telecommunications regulatory regimes on telecommunications sector tariffs,
telecommunications Internet services, telecommunications investment, and policy
mechanisms of both independent and nonindependent regulators on small economies of
the Commonwealth Caribbean. Knowledge of the effects of these differing regulatory
regimes may help small country governments in creating policies that will be optimal for
the development of their telecommunications and their economies. All of the
Commonwealth Caribbean nations are considered small countries or even microstates.
According to Ofa (2012), small economies have problems that are unique to them,
especially regarding the ICT sector. Based on the findings of this study, I developed
guidelines and recommendations for the regulatory body appropriate for the
Commonwealth Caribbean. I determined whether it was prudent for Caribbean
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governments that have not yet established any regulatory institutions to set them up,
either as independent of the ministry or as a governmental department. Other
governments may use the information from this study to determine whether to keep or
make defunct existing independent telecommunications agencies. Additionally, the
information may assist international institutions in revising their policies on independent
telecommunications institutions for small states.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
The overarching question that guided this study was the following: How do
independent regulators affect the economic development of the telecommunications
sector in small developing island states?
1.

How are telecommunications infrastructure in fixed line services affected

by regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the
telecoms sector, gross domestic product (GDP) and telephone tariffs?
H01: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable fixed line services.
H11: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do affect the dependent variable fixed line services.
2.

How are telecommunications infrastructure in cellular services affected by

the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the
telecoms sector, GDP and telephone tariffs?
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H02: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable cellular services.
H12: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do affect the dependent variable cellular services.
3.

How are telecommunications infrastructure in universal services (i.e.,

fixed lines and cellular services) affected by the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, competition in the telecoms sector, GDP and telephone
tariffs?
H03: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications
investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone tariffs do not have
any effect on the dependent variable universal services.
H13: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications
investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone tariffs do affect the
dependent variable universal services.
4.

What is the relationship between prices in the telecoms sector (telephone

tariffs) and the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment,
competition in the telecoms sector, GDP?
H04: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not
have any effect on the dependent variable prices.
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H14: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do affect
the dependent variable prices.
5.

What is the relationship between telecoms investment and the regulatory

regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and
GDP?
H05: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not
have any effect on the dependent variable telecoms investment.
H15: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector does affect
the dependent variable telecoms investment.
6.

What is the relationship between broadband usage and the regulatory

regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and
GDP?
H06: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not
have any effect on the dependent variable broadband usage.
H16: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do affect
the dependent variable broadband usage.
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7.

What is the relationship between competition in telecoms sector and

regulatory regime, population, telecommunication prices, and GDP?
H07: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP.
H17: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP.
Theoretical Framework
The reason governments intervene in a market is usually explained through social
theory (Posner, 1974). In economic regulation, intervention is mainly found in monopoly
suppliers’ arenas (Carpenter & Moss, 2013). Although there are several theories that
could explain the differing regulatory frameworks of each country, in this study, I used
capture theory. Capture theory is related to rent-seeking theory. Regulatory capture refers
to when government corporations and regulatory bodies that were mandated to ensure
that public needs are met act selectively to promote established players in the industry.
This change to being captured in behavior that generally occurs over time (Etzioni,
2009).
The results of capture are a shift of the regulatory agencies’ loyalty from the
public to private interest and the loss of neutrality and impartiality. The ties that develop
between regulatory officials and officials of private organizations can result in bias in
executing regulatory duties, which will lead to favors and protection of these
organizations being regulated at the expense of the public interest (Hamilton, 2013).
Capture theory is used to explain how regulatory frameworks in each country was
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developed, and it can be used as a foundation by a small developing
countries/governments deciding whether or not to create an independent
telecommunications regulatory agency. Regulatory capture involves the government or
its agencies being beholden to other market players, which could include both private
sector players and the government itself. The governments of small developing countries
are often vulnerable to regulatory capture and rent seeking in the name of good
governance.
Nature of the Study
I used an econometric approach to examine the relationship between the
dependent and control variables; I used a cross-sectional time series model from 1993 to
2012. This model fits this research because only annual data were available, so the
number of observations was limited. This methodology allows for a study of the variables
that would not be readily available via a purely cross-sectional or time series model,
because “variability is negligible, or not existent, across either time or space” (Podesta,
2000, p. 8). Because the observation period was limited to only 20 years, annual data
box-Jenkins or auto regressive moving average were not suitable for the analysis. A
cross-sectional panel model allows for the simultaneous capture of the variation over time
and space. I also used a fixed-effects model to indicate that certain features do not change
over time within a country but can be correlated with the regulatory regime and
competition within said country. The regression equation is time-invariant, thereby
addressing omitted variable bias (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). The
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data for this research came primarily from the ITU, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Caribbean Development Bank, and the World Bank.
Definitions
There were some key terms and definitions that were used in this study that may
differ from general use outside of this public policy making context and academic study.
The dependent and independent variables are defined in Chapter 3.
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL): The regulatory
institution that is responsible for telecommunications in the Eastern Caribbean States that
are members. “It is made up of three components – A Council of Ministers, a regional
Directorate and a National Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (NTRC) in each
Member State” (ECTEL, 2018, p. 2).
International Telecommunications Union (ITU): The U.N. agency for ICT. They
are responsible for “global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, develop the technical
standards that ensure networks and technologies seamlessly interconnect, and strive to
improve access to ICTs to underserved communities worldwide” (ITU, 2018, p. 1).
National Telecommunications Regulatory Commissions (NTRC): The countrylevel regulators within the Eastern Caribbean member states of ECTEL. Their
responsibility is to advise the responsible minister and process applications on the award
of licenses (ECTEL, 2018).
Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR): The multisector regulator of Jamaica whose
responsibility includes telecommunications, electricity, and water/sewage. It had also
regulated transportation but that was removed from its remit in 2014 (OUR, 2018).
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World Trade Organization (WTO): “The only global international organization
dealing with the rules of trade between nations” (WTO, 2018, p. 1). Also, “it operates a
global system of trade rules, it acts as a forum for negotiating trade agreements, it settles
trade disputes between its members and it supports the needs of developing countries”
(WTO, 2018, p. 1).
Assumptions
The data that were used in this study were numbers published by the institutions
of the ITU, World Bank, and the local telecommunications regulators that would have
access to said information. Although these data are also generally accepted by the
institutions to be inherently correct, the local government institutions that report the
information can have differing interpretations as to the definition used by the
international institutions. As pointed out by the ITU (2018),
Data are available for over 200 economies. However, it should be noted that since
ITU relies primarily on official economy data, availability of data for the different
indicators and years varies. Notes explaining data exceptions are also included.
The data are collected from an annual questionnaire sent to official economy
contacts, usually the regulatory authority or the ministry in charge of
telecommunication and ICT. Additional data are obtained from reports provided
by telecommunication ministries, regulators and operators and from ITU staff
reports. In some cases, estimates are made by ITU staff; these are noted in the
database. (para. 4)
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However, this information was assumed to be accurate and complete and was analyzed
for any outliers as part of the general econometric data analysis.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this dissertation was limited to the available data. I selected all 17 of
the English-speaking Caribbean countries and Bermuda, some of which are still
dependencies of England, for the analysis. The data might be unreliable, because the
government in power may sometimes under or overreport various statistics. Additionally,
the methods used by various governments to collect data on the same indicator and the
challenge of reliable data sources are problematic (Roshanthi & Rohan, 2013). Therefore,
information given to the ITU is not as exact as it should be; therefore, a degree of bias
exists. However, the cross-sectional component compensates for and corrects that bias.
I did not take into consideration the type of independence of each regulatory
body. Both structural and functional independence exist; however, I only considered
structurally independent bodies, and I defined them as any independent agency that is not
directly funded by the central government and stands alone pursuant to some act or law.
Limitations
The limitations of this study included how the study was set up using panel data.
In any given study, the results and analysis are only as valid as the type of data that are
inputted. All useful econometric models require “valid, reproducible and accurate time
series” (Alleman et al., n.d., p. 4.1). The data collected for this study were primarily from
the ITU statistics, of which electronic sources may be different than the published version
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of the same data. This panel data allowed me to look at each of the individual Caribbean
countries in my sample over the given time period, in this instance 20 years.
Any pooled time series analysis begins with the general assumption that it
behaves like a standard least-squares model. However, once the model is a pooled one,
there is a correction for nonstochastic variables that are generally included (Sayrs, 1989).
Additionally, pooling tends to cause the error to be contaminated from “time points
within one cross-section” or from “correlation in the error” from differing “cross-sections
at the same time point or from different cross-sections and different time points” (Sayrs,
1989, p. 13). The validity concerns will be addressed in Chapter 3.
Significance and Social Change Implications
SIDS, according to the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the
Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and SIDS (UNOHRLLS, 2011), are a “distinct group of developing countries facing specific social,
economic and environmental vulnerabilities” (p. 2). All of the English-speaking
Caribbean countries are considered SIDS, either because of geography or population size.
They are generally coerced into making policy decisions that are not necessarily
sustainable or suitable. With the promise of certain concessions by larger countries, they
usually accept these policies. Other SIDS adopted said policies in the hopes of also
increasing social welfare for their citizens. However, policies that are reasonable for large
countries do not necessarily impact SIDS in the same way. For example, the large
countries that created independent telecommunication agencies have created a better
telecommunications sector for themselves, but this may not necessarily be true for SIDS.
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As various SIDS continue to contemplate the policy of an independent
telecommunications regulator, the findings of this research should add to the debate in the
country about the necessity of independent telecommunications regulators. Additionally,
SIDS need to evaluate the cost benefit of implementing a policy creating a regulatory
framework to accommodate an independent telecommunications agency and, if they do
decide to implement such a policy, they need to ensure that it is tailored to reflect their
circumstances.
Summary
This quantitative study comprised a public policy and administrative exploration
into the challenge of determining the telecommunications regulatory framework that
would be suitable for a SIDs. The overarching research question was the following: How
do independent regulators affect the economic development of the telecommunications
sector in small developing island states? A cross-sectional time series analysis was used
to determine the possible relationships that may exist with these variables. By addressing
this issue as a public policy concern, the study will add to the debate as to the best policy
in determining what telecommunications framework would be optimal.
In Chapter 1, I presented the overview of the quantitative research study. Chapter
2 includes an exploration of regulatory theory of capture and external factors such as the
WTO on telecommunications reform in the Caribbean, along with various reforms that
have occurred, and the quantitative research design.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The telecommunications regulatory frameworks of independently regulated and
government-regulated activity have differing effects on the small economies of the
Commonwealth Caribbean. Regulatory theory is significant to public sector reforms and
actions. Although there has been the creation of independent telecommunications
regulatory institutions in many of the English-speaking Caribbean countries, the
effectiveness of these institutions on the respective economies has not been measured.
The theoretical lens through which I examined telecommunications reforms and the
public policy actions was capture theory. In the literature review, I explain how the
various telecommunications regulatory frameworks came about, and the rationale behind
the statistical analysis that will be completed in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, I
will provide a synthesis of the literature reviewed and an overview of my research
methodology. I will consider regulation as well as define independent regulation, and
then provide a detailed analysis of the types of regulatory capture that can occur. I will
follow with a historical context of independent regulation in the. At the end of Chapter 2,
I will draw conclusions that will be applied to Chapter 3.
Literature Search Strategy
The use of the Internet was the principal search vehicle through which I obtained
the literature for this review. This included the use of online libraries and academic
research databases. Among the journal databases searched, those that generated the most
applicable results were Sage, JSTOR, EBSCO, Wiley, and Elsevier. Key terms used in
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the searches included capture theory and independent regulatory agencies, regulatory
capture and developing countries, and SIDS and capture theory. I accessed a multitude of
other databases during the search process as well. I selected the peer-reviewed feature to
ensure that all of the literature generated would fit this designation.
I reviewed current literature containing empirical research in the relevant areas,
which appeared in a range of publications, such as the Journal of Economic Literature,
the International Review of Social Sciences, Policy Studies Journal, Econ Journal Watch,
and the American Political Science Review. I identified articles in searches conducted
using Google Scholar, with a preference for peer-reviewed journals, and through Internet
search engines such as Google and Scirus, with a filter applied for peer-reviewed
journals. Additionally, once I had identified key authors in this manner, the corpus of
their work was reviewed for other relevant research, and other works cited by those
authors were similarly reviewed. I reviewed identified journals, particularly in
specifically-themed issues, for other relevant work.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical basis of this study was about the effectiveness of the Englishspeaking Caribbean independent telecommunications regulators within the public policymaking context of regulatory capture. However, it is important to understand why
governments wish to intervene in certain sectors of the economy and regulate how
companies in those sectors behave. According to Dudley and Brito (2012), governments
intervene or regulate various economic sectors because of the perception that there is
some market failure. Such market failures take the form of a deviation from a perfectly
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competitive market. In trying to rationalize why regulation takes place, several
conceptual frameworks have been developed, including a distinction between economic
and social types of regulation (Viscusi, Harrington, & Vernon, 1996). Economic
regulation includes aspects of entry into and exit from a market, prices on the market, and
quality of service issues. Social regulation deals with environmental and consumerrelated matters (Hertog, 1999). Economic regulation is generally imposed on monopoly
suppliers, especially those specializing in public utilities. The theories can be further
divided into “positive and normative theories” (Hertog, 1999, p. 224). The former is what
truly occurs, and the latter reflects what should ideally occur (Felkins, 2013).
Regulation Defined
Although Hertog (1999) posited that there is no definition of regulation in any
available economic and legal literature, McLean (2002) stated, “Regulation has been in
existence for as long as governments have interfered in private actions: that is, forever”
(p. 2). McLean also indicated that regulation started out as a good idea and was not the
mere “naked expropriation of one group in favor of another” (p. 2).
According Baldwin and Cave (as cited in Baldwin, Scott, & Hood, 1998),
regulation “is spoken about as if [it is] an identifiable and discrete mode of governmental
activity” (p. 2.). Selznick regarded it as “the sustained and focused control implemented
by a public agency over actions that are valued by a community” (as cited in Baldwin &
Cave, 1999, p. 2). However, this definition differs from Stigler’s (1971) definition.
Stigler suggested that industries and the private sector have created their own standards
of operation, which they then operate for their own benefit. Stigler believed that
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industries need protection, probably from the community, while Baldwin and Cave (as
cited in Baldwin, Scott, & Hood, 1998) perceived the community as needing protection
from the industries.
Becker’s views on regulation are not synonymous with Baldwin and Cave’s.
Becker (1976) stated, “A firm is said to be in a monopolistic position when its demand
curve is negatively inclined in such a way that a monopolist would maximize his income
at the output level where marginal revenue equals marginal cost” (p. 94). Government
regulations arise when the government, or the regulator, plays the role of the market in
determining the marginal prices that monopolistic companies should charge. Becker also
discussed regulation. Becker stated:
For at least 200 years, economists have been trying to understand why some
industries are competitive and others monopolistic. And for an almost equally
long period, two competing explanations have been offered: one stresses the
technological conditions that make monopoly inevitable, the other stresses the
incentives to come together to suppress competition. (p. 95)
In each of these explanations offered by Becker, regulation must take place or, more
specifically, governments have to regulate monopolistic firms to enjoy profits.
Kahn (1993) stated that regulation is generally viewed as “maintaining the
institutions within whose framework the free market can continue to function; and
enforcing, supplementing and removing the imperfections of competition” (p. 2). Kahn
discussed regulation primarily in terms of public utilities, whose “acceptable performance
is attributed not to competition or self-restraint but to direct government involvement in
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the major aspects of their structures and economic performance” (p. 3). Without the
government regulating monopolies, firms would strive to achieve high profits to the
detriment of the public. Kahn also dealt with “the legal rationale” (p. 3). This is the right
of a government to regulate monopolies. Kahn indicated that the right to regulate is
driven by the fact that individual states within the United States had to give up the right
of way when it came to public property; governments were, therefore, obliged to impose
on the operators “various regulatory conditions” (Kahn, 1993, p. 3).
The following is a summary of the theoretical economic rationale behind
regulation, as stated by Kahn (1993):
1. Monopolistic industries (especially public utilities) are important to the growth of
the entire economy, because they contribute to the total national output. They also
supply essential inputs to other industries.
2. Most of the utility companies are monopoly providers; therefore, their costs tend
to be lower if they are the sole suppliers of a commodity in the market.
3. Due to a variety of possible reasons, competition does not work well in the sector.
With the exception of Stigler (1971), the aforementioned theorists all believe that
government regulation of monopoly providers is there for the protection of consumers.
Stigler, on the other hand, believed that it is the monopoly providers who need protection
from society.
Independent Regulation
The concept of independent regulation stems from the idea of central bank
independence (CBI), which refers to the separation of monetary policy makers from those
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in political administration. Walsh (2005) reported that, during the 1970s and 1980s,
industrialized economies had long inflationary periods because of the political
authorities’ short-term plans to meet expansionary goals at the expense of longer-term
inflationary effects. Walsh stated, “If the ability of elected officials to distort monetary
policy results in excessive inflation, then countries whose central banks are independent
of such pressure should experience lower rates of inflation,” and the empirical evidence
suggests the same (p. 2). Hence, an independent regulatory body that is separated from
the political directorate was needed for more stable inflation rates. Stern and Trillas
(2001) reported that the effects of an independent central bank on the macroeconomic
situation of a country are generally good for a country. Stern and Trillas also pointed out
that there are similarities between independent central banks and independent
telecommunications regulators: Both have a need for consistent policies and similar
organizational design (Stern &Trillas, 2001). In order for an independent regulator to be
successful, the political directorate should not interfere with its operations.
However, Hayo and Hefeker (2002) challenged the CBI idea and believed that,
although there may be a statistical correlation between low inflation rates and perceived
CBI, low inflation has more to do with the conservatism of a country and its political
influence than with CBI. Hayo and Hefeker used Japan as an example, because it has low
inflation rates, although its central bank works with the ministry of finance. Additionally,
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) found that “Legal independence (of the Central
Bank) is inversely related to inflation in industrial (countries),” but they further suggested
that, for developing countries, “the more frequently the chief executive (of the central
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bank) is changed, the higher the measure of its independence” (p. 353). Generally, in the
Caribbean there is not independence in the activities of the central banks, because the
banks’ chief executives rarely change.
Regulatory independence consists of three major elements: an independent
relationship where the parties act in their own interests to regulate firms and consumers,
political authorities, and organizational autonomy (Smith, 1997). Brown et al. (2006)
described the idea of regulatory independence, indicating that it is merely “decisionmaking independence” in that the regulator does not consult any entity or person before
making a decision, but may instead consult a court of law or an appellate body set up to
oversee the regulatory institution (p. 50). Wu (2004) stated that the indicators of true
independence have to do with “the stability of its leadership, the scope of its authority,
and the independence of its funding” (p. 6). Regulatory independence is important
because, without it, all of the identified entities (ie., regulated firms, consumers, and
political authorities) would act in their own interests. An example of why self-interest
should not be allowed to override public interests occurred when, as Jamison (2009)
reported, the Iowa governor appointed Commissioner Dennis Nagel to the Iowa Utilities
Board and asked Nagel not to do anything that would cost the governor the next election.
The governor failed to mention the protection of shareholders or consumers, or even legal
compliance (Jamison, 2009). The role of the regulator is a balancing act. Smith (1997)
described it as “special challenges” that face a utility regulator; hence, a regulator needs
to be independent in order to make the best decision (p. 3).
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According to Brown et al. (2006), there are two main features to regulation:
“Regulatory governance” and “regulatory substance” (p. 19). Regulatory governance
includes ideas such as “accountability of the regulator” and “the relationship between
policy makers and the regulator” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 19). Regulatory substance, on the
other hand, deals with determining tariffs and the quality of service by the operator
(Brown et al., 2006). Conversely, Smith (1997) believed that regulation has three main
aims: to protect consumers from abuse by firms, to support firms or investors from
arbitrary actions by government, and to promote economic efficiency. As Mohammed
and Strobl (2011) stated, there is a positive effect on access to telephone services when
there is an “independent regulator” and “privatization,” which form the basis of
telecommunications reforms (p. 93-94). Mohammed and Strobl concluded that, for the
“efficient development of the telecommunications industry in a developing country,”
there must be a “separate regulatory body” and that this body must be functional (p. 95).
The Caribbean countries that created independent telecommunications institutions did so
through legislative means that made the regulatory governance transparent.
Research Design
There is a relationship between the independent telecommunications regulator and
the various economic and telecommunications network variables. Income and market
reform (i.e., competition) and the size of the network are among the primary drivers of
growth (Banerjee & Ros, 2004). Mohamed and Strobl (2009) indicated that an
independent regulator is also relevant and important for the growth of fixed networks (p.
92). Although there is research on fixed networks or mobile networks in developing
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countries, these are substitutable, and mobile networks are fast replacing fixed networks,
as copper is being replaced by wireless or mobile. There have been several quantitative
studies on the relationship between the regulator and the telecommunications industry
(Baudrier, 2001; Symeou & Pollit, 2007). Additionally, there have been several time
series studies and panel data studies that relate to the choice of economic variables and
the regulator, but these variables have been on developed and/or larger developing
countries (Baudrier, 2001; Mohamed & Strobl, 2010; Ros & Banerjee, 2000; Trillas,
2010).
Time Series, Panel Data, and Variables
A precedent has been provided by using other times series and panel data analysis
on the impact of a regulator (Mohammed & Strobl, 2011). I replicated previous studies,
substituting data from the Caribbean countries. The independent regulator binary variable
(1–yes, 0–no) was used as the explanatory variable. To take the panel structure of the
data into account (repeated measures over countries and years), each regression also
included country-fixed effects that allow the intercept of the regression model to vary by
country, thus accounting for time-invariant, cross-country differences. The dependent
variables were log-transformed, so that the effect of the regulator’s independence can be
expressed in percentages.
The literature has given guidance on the variables of choice. The ITU dataset is
annual, runs from 1993 to 2012, allows for a period of time during which the
telecommunications framework was nonindependent, across the time period that an
independent framework was created. Additionally, this fits in with the ITU data for their
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given 20-year period. In some instances, the change in the regulatory framework would
have been allowed to have existed for at least 10 years. One notable variable exception in
the data is the existence of an external event that had the effect of almost destroying one
of the islands, namely a volcano in Montserrat.
The main variable of interest for this research (i.e., the independent variable) was
the telecommunications sector and the economy. Although there are many degrees of
independence, such as functional independence, I was concerned only with statutory
independence (i.e., independence created by legislative fiat). The decision as to the
creation of an independent regulator is one of public record, primarily due to an act of the
government. This variable was created as a simple 0-1 type dummy variable. The result
would be 0 for each year before the legislative fiat for the creation of the regulator, and 1
for each year thereafter.
In accordance with standard practice and consistent with the hypothesis, the
primary variable was the penetration level of basic telecommunications services (which
was the sum of both fixed and mobile customers). I used data from both the World Bank
and the ITU databases. Following standard practice, the dependent variable in the model
specification was fixed/mainline per capita, and it represented the fixed level of
penetration for telecommunications (Baudrier, 2001; Mohammed &Stobl, 2009;
Wallsten, 2001). However, unlike what previous standard models have presented, the
updated form of the model included information about mobile penetration, because it was
a possible substitute for fixed lines (Van der Berg & Song, 2012; Ward & Woroch,
2004). Both the World Bank and the ITU have compiled data on both main/fixed lines
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and mobile/cellular information. The sum of these two variables creates a dependent
variable. Although cellular service was considered relatively new and less regulated, it
was accepted as a viable solution in developing countries, because the infrastructure costs
associated with wireless are less than the infrastructure costs of other network solutions.
Tariffs are considered the main reason for telecommunications regulators. The
prices that consumers face can determine their demand for telecommunications services
(Trillas, 2010); regulators tend balance between consumers and providers. Regulators
ensure providers are compensated for their service, but also limit any super profits
(Wheatley, 1999). There have been several studies relating to various tariffs (i.e., prices
offered by providers to their customers).
Internet or Broadband usage is one of the cornerstones that richer nations have
more of and poorer nations have less of, and it is believed that Internet services “has had
measurable effects on economic growth for all nations” (Jorgenson & Vu, 2016, p. 384).
Wallsten (2002) recognized that there is a correlation between the telecoms regulatory
approach to Internet service providers and the number of Internet users (p. 14).
A regulatory framework and regulators impact both the telecoms investment and
economic growth of a country (Telecommunications Development Sector of the ITU,
2012). According to the Telecommunications Development Sector of the ITU (2012),
telecoms investment does have an impact on both developed and developing countries.
Regulators do play a role as to the quantity and type of investment that occurs in a given
country; this was also evident in the ECTEL countries (Gilchrist, 2015; Sridhar &
Sridhar, 2008).

34
Regulatory Capture Theory
According to the theory of regulatory capture, the administrative agencies
established to protect the interests of the general public from private business entities
serve the benefits of those private bodies instead of safeguarding the rights and interests
of the public (Schultz, 2004, p. 363). Such agencies are said to have been captured by
private interests, and they start using regulation as a method of avoiding competition to
maximize profits. Regulatory capture theory, mostly associated with Stigler, was initially
developed as an alternative to public interest theory after the latter had been discredited
(Hertog, 1999). Regulatory capture can be defined as regulators or regulatory agencies
putting the interests of regulated industries ahead of the interests of the public or the
consumers. This change in the regulator’s behavior tends to occur over a long time (i.e.,
as the regulators develop and mature, they become captured; Etzioni, 2009). There are
several other categories of regulatory capture, as identified by Mitnick (2011), who
argued that regulatory capture is more complex than what has been generally put forward.
Mitnick stated, “It is a set of behavior pattern and relationships that can be produced in
many ways, often acting in conjunction with one another” (p. 37). Mitnick suggested that
there are six categories of capture, which I will discuss in the proceeding paragraphs
(p. 37).
Systemic Capture
The first category of capture as defined by Mitnick (2011) is systemic capture that
takes place due to powers of certain interest groups propagating their interests in a
manner that leads to bias by the regulatory institutions at the expense of other competing
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interest groups. Interest groups have a tendency to strive for profit maximization, and one
of the ways to do so is through influencing the regulatory process. However, some groups
have more power than others, which leads to a misbalanced scale of competition. Truly
democratic and pluralistic values can prevent this imbalance. Each group would consist
of a small circle of active elites that would circulate instead of dominate due to consistent
elections. However, in reality, power imbalances shield the interests of powerful interest
groups. Generally, this phenomenon can be termed as imbalanced affective access
politics, which leads to another form of systemic capture in the shape of subgovernmental
institutionalization (Mitnick, 2011, p. 38).
Various terms have been used to describe this phenomenon, including issue
network and advocacy coalitions. These subgovernments often exhibit a state of capture,
with consistent actions by stable power actors to align their interests together. “Iron
triangle” is the term used for the outcome, in which legislatures, bureaucracies, and
interest groups start reinforcing mutual interests in a cyclic manner. The formation of
such iron triangles is detrimental for the regulatory process, as formal institutional lines
start to vanish and the governance becomes virtual. It leads to outcomes and policies that
safeguard only the interests of the regulated industry, which is usually the real capturing
interest group. One example of such an iron triangle is the military industrial complex,
consisting of defense contractors such as the Pentagon, the Congress, and the executive
branch (Greenwald, 2012).
Another form of systemic regulatory capture that Mitnick (2011) also identified is
regulatory arbitrage (p. 39). Sometimes the mismatch between regulatory resources and
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capabilities produces a space for regulated actors to use that space to their advantage.
Examples include the banking sector, which is prone to regulatory arbitrage. Karolyi and
Taboad (2015) stated that the large banks that operate globally can strategically choose
their locations of operation, or engage in mergers and acquisitions where regulatory
enforcement regimes are less strict and cheaper than their locations of origin (p. 1). Such
activities can result in regulatory competition with “race-to-the-bottom” situations in the
overall banking regulation, as well as threats to the international financial system. The
acquiring bank has the opportunity to extract subsidies from the host regulator to pursue
its weakly monitored activities (Hardy, 2006, p. 1).
A method used globally to address the issue of imbalance between interest groups
producing systemic capture is “proxy advocates” or “consumer advocates.” These are
formal agents who represent the interests of those groups that lack the power to bias the
regulatory system. In the United States, most of these institutions were established in the
1970s to incorporate the feedback of utility consumers in legal and administrative
proceedings. Consumer advocates argue on behalf of those consumers who are poorly
organized to plead their case during regulatory hearings. One such group is residential
utility consumers, whose membership numbers are much greater than those of industrial
consumers, but their ability to collectively advocate for rights are much less. Through the
efforts of consumer advocates, residential consumers were able to achieve lower rate
rulings, and they resisted demands for raising utility tariffs (Holburn &Vanden Bergh,
2006, p. 61). Effective consumer empowerment programs have led to win-win situations
for both the consumers and businesses, as consumers can relish product safety while
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businesses enjoy increased consumer trust (Wood, 2017, p. 650). Overall, according to
Schwarz (2013), consumer advocacy institutions are helpful in balancing the power
difference between different interest groups and preventing systemic regulatory capture
(p. 44).
Chronical Capture
A form of regulatory capture was observed in post-Communist states due to
previous power imbalances. Highly centralized systems of governance were a source of
these imbalances, negatively affecting the administrative and economic reforms that took
place in the states and attempted to liberalize their economies during the 1990s. The
outcomes of these impaired reforms led to the formation of state capture in which interest
groups were able to hold the legislature, the executive offices, and the judiciary under
their control. Laws and regulations were shaped to benefit a concentrated segment of
regulated industries, which were able to draw monetary and political profits at the
expense of smaller groups and the overall economy. Scholars have studied the dominance
of the corporate sector that produced state capture in all of the European states with
Communist inclinations (Mitnick, 2011, p. 45).
Early policy choices made by these transitioning states into a crucial factor in
deciding the fate of the entire regulatory reform process, as they had an irregularly high
influence on the outcomes of reforms (Young, 2010, p. 3). Wrong choices in the early
years of transition led to the foreclosure of certain options that were previously open.
Policy choices made at the later stages had a lesser influence on the reform process, as
they could not alter the path already adopted. Once an opportunity window was missed,

38
profiteering business interest groups were able to trap such transitioning nations into a
vicious cycle. Young (2010) further argued that such an institutional capture had more
detrimental consequences for the macroeconomic outlook of a country, when compared
with the impacts of high-level corruption committed with the objective of one-time gains
(p. 3). Institutional capture regularizes the imbalance by shaping the rules of business,
benefitting the captors.
Romania experienced state capture during the first 7 years of transition, in which
the former Communist bureaucracy remained at the forefront, mainly due to their
relationship with the ruling political parties (Vachudova, 2005, p. 50). The privatization
of state entities on a broad scale without the due transparency process lay the ground for
regulatory capture during the early years of transition. The Social Democratic Party
dominated the Romanian power scene between 1990 and 1996, and again between 2000
and 2004. Grodeland (2007) stated that during the days of Communism, a distinct form of
political culture evolved in many such countries, including Romania, in which party
secretaries had powers to handle issues of every type (p. 250). Later on, these public
perceptions of party secretaries led to the belief that the problems that could previously
be solved through contacts with party secretaries could now be solved through informal
contacts with elected representatives. Interest groups made use of these informal
networks for personal profits in situations where weak, contradictory, and excessive
regulations did not allow legitimate outcomes to be achieved. Informal networks are
defined as an “informal circle of people joining together with the intention of extracting
benefits out of their association and to persist with this association over time”
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(Grodeland, 2007, p. 220). Countries such as Bulgaria and Romania had more widespread
usage of informal networks by regulated industries to achieve hidden ambitions.
Klimina (2009) stated that since the early 1990s, researchers from various
multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have been applying the
neoclassical institutionalist approach to research the patterns of a nexus between state
capture, a weak institutional framework, and rent-seeking interest groups (p. 373). The
causes of state capture in these states have been a history of undemocratic governments
coupled with an institutionalized bias of incentive structure towards individualistic
associations and inappropriate costs to rent-seeking, which ease the way for increased
corruption.
Relational Capture
Elected officials exert control over bureaucracies. This pattern of control is not
limited to the appointments of officials and how the oversight proceedings of regulatory
agencies are conducted, but extends to budgetary controls, forging the behavior of an
agency, procedural manipulations, media coverage, influences from chief executives,
altering the decision-making costs, and taking actions to affect the prominence of certain
regulatory officials. The principal-agent model has been presented to explain the
relationship between legislatures and heads of regulatory bodies. Now, for regulatory
capture to occur, the agency must be able to go beyond this political clout and create an
affiliation with the regulated industry that is based on a consistent bias towards the
industry’s interests.
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Getting reelected is a basic desire of any legislator, and for that purpose, electoral
campaigning requires funds. Regulated industries can fund the electoral campaigns of
influential politicians, especially those who oversee the working of regulatory agencies.
Legislators are obligated to listen to these industries in their constituencies and help them
by originating legislations that protect and promote their interests. On the other hand,
regulators depend on legislators for the funding of their agencies, which are directly
linked to their reputation as regulators. The regulated industry can affect their reputation
by making direct complaints to legislators about their performance shortcomings
(Mitnick, 2008, p. 1197). This type of relational governance works on the flow of
incentives between the three corners of the iron triangle.
The general target of any capturing entity is to install biased governance in place
of a neutral governance. There are many methods to achieve this objective, including the
usage of incentives to change the favors of the existing regulatory officials, using power
to substitute unbiased managers with biased ones, changing the locations of regulators so
that they are unable to detect regulatory violations, draining the human resources of an
agency through forcing out regulators with technical expertise, and by shifting the control
of regulation to other governments that lack enforcement capabilities due to their political
sensitivities.
Better employment prospects for any regulatory agency official can act as a
catalyst for the capture of that agency. The regulated industry has an interest in human
resources with in-depth knowledge of the industry and the right connections with
influential persons in the legislature and allied bureaucracy. This need for regulatory
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capital leads to the development of a “revolving door,” where regulated industries hire
regulators with good repute to help them deal with the regulatory process. The incentives
of lucrative employment opportunities for regulatory officials in the regulated industry
can produce leniency in the regulations or utilities pricing procedures. Law and Long
(2012) found that laws designed to curb this phenomenon through post government
employment restrictions in various U. S. states did not reduce residential or commercial
electricity prices, but did reduce industrial electricity prices for a short period of time,
indicating that such laws can only temporarily slow down the process of regulatory
capture (p. 434). Dal Bo (2006) also found that those commissioners appointed to the
FCC that had a broadcasting industry background voted in favor of the industry on
several occasions, illustrating how the revolving door works (p. 217). The revolving door
is not limited to agency officials joining the regulated industry, but also includes
congressional staffers being appointed as commissioners as a favor for their services to
legislators.
Functional Capture
Regulators require information about industrial processes to perform their
regulatory decision making. The regulated industry is considered to be the best source of
that information. However, the industry has a tendency to filter the amount and quality of
information reaching the regulator in accordance with their interests. The regulatory
process can become captured if the information quality and interpretation is determined
by the providers of the information, especially in regulatory determinations (Croley,
2011).
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Excessive information can be fed in the disguise of transparency, making
pluralistic participation difficult for smaller interest groups with fewer resources. Timeconsuming and costly regulatory processes (ie., hearings, briefings, public notice periods,
etc.) create impediments for marginalized interest groups, while protecting the interests
of incumbent firms already relishing the benefits of regulation. Purely legal systems may
have the necessary safeguards against this “filter failure.” but administrative rule-making
often lacks such mechanisms. Such a system that can place the deciding authority at the
mercy of an unstoppable flow of information from an unopposed group, which also has
the capability to strengthen its submissions by a litigation threat, is said to be captured by
information (Mills & Koliba, 2014)
The magnitude of regulatory capture increases with the degree of complexity and
technicality involved in the information, as it can overwhelm an under resourced agency.
One such example is that of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) in the wake of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster. The agency was facing difficulties due to the complexities
of deep-water drilling operations, as well as a lack of resources dedicated towards
training and inspection functions (Wagner, 2010, p. 11). Drilling companies were
involved in unsafe cost-cutting techniques, which could have been curbed if the MMS
had inducted safety experts capable of making the required risk analysis. Overall, this
informational disadvantage suffered by the agency allowed the regulated industry to
proceed with their unsafe practices, leading to the catastrophic disaster. One of the
methods that can be employed by regulatory agencies to reduce this informational
disadvantage is the use of an incident reporting system where industry employees can
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report regulatory violations in return for immunity and confidentiality (Wagner, 2010, p.
17).
Regulatory agencies benefit from the perceptions of their superior expertise in
dealing with the complex technical affairs of the industries under their regulation. One of
the basic motives behind the creation of regulatory bodies is that they will consist of
permanent staff with expertise regarding the regulated industry that is missing in the
legislature or judiciary, and that the regulatory body will enjoy public support due to this
perceived strength. Such competency myths become mandatory for agencies working in
resource-constrained environments, or in scenarios where multiple agencies regulate
multiple aspects of an industry’s behavior. The hype surrounding the effectiveness of
agencies helps to improve industry compliance, especially when credence goods are
involved, for which customers lack the skills to assess their true utility. Carpenter (2013)
argued that the Federal Drug Authority in the United States, which is mainly tasked with
regulating the pharmaceutical industry, has thrived based on its superior reputation over
time and has been able to accumulate power due to this quality.
Individual Capture
Regulators working in different agencies have individualistic goals regarding their
profession, apart from the usual objectives of their agencies. Such tendencies make these
organizations a collection of unitary actors who act in a rational manner. Such
individualistic aspirations are similar to those of legislators who intend to get reelected.
Common assumptions about regulators include a hassle-free managerial life and lucrative
employment opportunities once they leave the agency. Representatives of the regulated
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industry try to incentivize agency officials to protect the interests of their industry.
Influencers from the industry are assumed to be “perfect agents,” while regulators are not
(Mitinick, 2011, p. 42).
The outcome of this individualistic incentive model is the iron triangle, in which
the interests of industries, regulators, and legislators are affiliated. Legislators need votes
and money to get reelected. Regulated industries help them with campaign funds. In
return, legislators serving on oversight committees facilitate the industry’s agenda.
Legislators have an influence over regulators, as they have budgetary controls and can
expose flaws in their management. Therefore, regulators are careful to cater to the
preferences of legislators, or else they end up facing costly interventions that can hamper
their individual and collective prospects.
To regulate industries, regulators are in need of information about the industry.
Regulators prefer to interact with industry officials to get the information they require for
their own working, as most of the time it is costly to extract information by means other
than from the industry itself. The industry is aware that having good relations with the
regulators will help them during regulatory monitoring and evaluations. Reed (2009)
argued that banks with less conflict with regulators, and a greater investment in the
relationship with regulators, receive better evaluations (p. 171). Such banks with less
negative attention from the regulators are able to invest their resources into other areas,
helping them to improve their customer reputation in the market. Regulators start
learning ways in which their regulatory capital can help them in the future, such as
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working for the industry and dealing with the regulatory process themselves. This
situation produces regulatory capture due to the circulation of individual incentives.
Capture is further enhanced when a small set of regulators interacts with only a
few firms in an industry, have been trained by the same industry, have fewer prospects of
job promotion in their agencies, or are compensated poorly. Three types of patterns
emerge from this individualistic analysis of regulatory capture. First, the regulators can
be offered monetary incentives in the form of bribes. The second scenario involves a
group of regulators facing resource constraints, short deadlines, and complex tasks; they
are forced to maintain close relationships with industry personnel with whom they must
meet to streamline regulatory processes, which leads to a reduction in the stringency of
the regulatory enforcement. The third scenario revolves around the difficulties faced by
regulators trained in the same industry having trouble extracting credible competing
information about the industry. With the passage of time, all three scenarios lead to a
situation in which the behaviors and attitudes of regulators become indistinguishable
from the regulated industry individuals. Overall, the result is regulatory capture (Mitnick,
2011, p. 42).
Constitutional Capture
Regulatory capture can emerge due to certain systemic biases, resulting in
outcomes mainly due to biased laws, legislative actions, or other faulty regulations that
produce benefits for interest groups at the expense of others. This effect complements the
systemic capture or imbalanced affective access politics aspect where different interest
groups have varying degrees of power to affect the regulatory process. The concept of
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state capture also refers to the capturing of “rules of the games,” which were discussed
under the chronical effects producing regulatory capture in post-Communist European
states.
Several researchers have studied the relationship between corruption and
regulatory governance. Most of them focus on the conventional form of corruption,
involving bribes being paid by private entities to public servants in order to fulfill the
interests of their firms (Kauffman, 2004, p. 90). The public sector is not the only shaper
of the investment outlook of a country. There is a complicated framework of
reciprocation between the corporate and public sectors during the policy-making process,
whereby influential regulated industrial sectors exert pressure to shape legislation, rules,
and public policy forming the rules of the game and the business environment within
which those sectors operate (Kauffman, 2005, p. 88). There is increasing focus on acts of
corruption that may be legal in some countries, but are causing regulatory capture. Such
acts stem from unbalanced playing fields, where laws and institutions have been shaped
in a manner to protect vested interests.
An example of such legal provisions that lead to corruption is the exploitation of
legal loopholes to engage in political funding. Such funding can produce influence on
policy-shaping institutions and regulatory agencies, helping the interests of contributing
private bodies at the cost of larger public interests. Another example of such legal
corruption is the favoritism observed during the procurement process conducted by the
public or private sectors, in which there may be no involvement of illegal bribery but the
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procurement rules lack transparency, and the level playing field may be absent
(Kauffman, 2004, p. 90).
The World Trade Organization
The WTO is an international institution that seeks to regulate trade and liberalize
various sectors of a country’s economy to facilitate easy trade between countries. It was
created on February 15th, 1997, by 69 nations during the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations (WTO, 2014). The GATT was not
as far-reaching or encompassing as the WTO, because it excluded trade in services,
intellectual property, and technology. As part of the services agreement,
telecommunications were among the first sectors to be regulated under the WTO
guidelines. In addition to regulating trade, the WTO settles disputes between countries,
monitors rules governing trade, and also facilitates capacity-building for less-developed
countries (WTO, 2014).
Countries that committed to the WTO had to agree to the “Reference Paper,”
which formed the guiding principles and definitions for the regulatory framework of the
telecommunications sector. The countries had to guarantee interconnection between each
other (i.e., the physical or logical linking of networks), employ anticompetitive
precautions, and set up independent regulators (WTO, 2014). The WTO intentionally left
out the definition of an independent regulator. The WTO’s only requirement concerning
the regulator was that it should not be involved in the business of telecommunications
(WTO, 2014). Historically, few governments of developing countries had any interest in
telecommunications, except for the pricing of local services, and these governments
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never linked this to any form of trade. The first telecommunications companies in the
English-speaking Caribbean developing countries were self-regulated; they determined
the quality of services they offered, allocated and licensed the radio frequency spectrum,
and determined the prices for international services. However, with the respective
governments complying with the WTO agreements, the companies now had to be
subjected to government oversight.
The WTO (2014) discovered that its developing country members had difficulties
adhering to the WTO guidelines due to a lack of resources, including finances and
qualified personnel (WTO, 2014). The WTO allowed special provisions and exceptions
to these developing countries (e.g., longer time periods to implement agreements and
commitments) and offered technical assistance from the WTO itself. Jawara and Kwa
stated “developing countries were bullied and coerced into complying with agreements
that most of them strongly disagreed with,” and that the benefits resulting from
complying with the WTO’s guidelines were not felt by the developing countries (as cited
in Staiger, 2009, pp. 2-3). Staiger (2009) concluded that the WTO was not equipped to
handle small developing countries’ problems. Additionally, as Sampson and Chambers
(2008) explained, after compliance, the only benefits arising from the free-trade that the
developing countries could enjoy was in the long-term. In the short-term, however, the
costs of structural adjustments and a loss of trade preferences were high; therefore, the
developing countries required additional financial help, but the WTO could not provide
them with monetary assistance (Sampson & Chambers, 2008).
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Small Island Developing States and the World Trade Organization
Although the WTO was created with the objective of ensuring that all countries
participate on one level, the problems faced by developing countries, such as those in the
SIDS regions, concerning issues with trade agreements were difficult. Small economies
faced challenges meeting their trade obligations because of their “lack of economies of
scale, limited resources and high transport costs” (WTO, 2014, p. 1). Although there is
still no single definition of SIDS, scholars associate the word small in SIDS with
population size, the size of the country, and its economic activity as defined by the GDP.
According to Read (2001), the idea of small continues to evolve in the literature, ranging
from 10 to 15 million people; although, in the 1970s, the World Bank adopted 1 million
as the upper end of small (Read, 2001). According to the World Bank (2013), small states
share some distinct characteristics; among them are limited access to capital and income
volatility. Also, from the perspective of the ECLAC (2000), the Caribbean SIDS, in
particular, were vulnerable due to certain socioeconomic and natural characteristics,
identified as follows:
•

Environmental/ecological vulnerability, particularly high exposure to natural,
climatic catastrophes

•

Limited land resources and difficulties with waste disposal management

•

Geographic remoteness and isolation

•

Limited diversification and open economies

•

Weak institutional capacities and high costs of basic infrastructure

•

Special social vulnerabilities. (para. 5)
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For this study, although not every one of these descriptors may be applicable, they
were a reminder of the challenges facing SIDS. These vulnerabilities are not unique to
SIDS; however, developing countries in general experience the same issues to varying
degrees (ECLAC, 2000).
Another difficulty SIDS face is the problem of good governance. Duncan and
Chand stated that when educated persons control all aspects of the economy, ranging
from the judiciary, to the police, the army and the senior bureaucracy, and are related
through family ties or have gone to the same schools, then the idea of having checks and
balances becomes difficult to implement (as cited in Ofa, 2012, p. 15). However, in spite
of the challenges SIDS face, they can still prosper. As Ofa (2012) and Moreira and
Mendoza (2007) explained, SIDS are not different from larger, more developed countries
in their need for economic growth; therefore, they should be treated similarly to the larger
countries. Although there are similarities with larger, developed countries with regards to
growth, Ofa and the WTO (2013) concluded that SIDS must be treated in a special way
regarding their policy reform processes.
Telecommunications Reform
Several factors drive telecommunications reform, also referred to as
telecommunications liberalization. Chief among these are technological innovations, both
in wireless and new data transmission techniques. With the onset of the Modified Final
Judgment that went into effect in 1984, a U.S. court ordered telecommunications giant
AT&T to break up into smaller entities. This breakup showed that the provision of
telecommunications services no longer had to be within the domain of a single integrated

51
monopoly. Britain soon adopted this model; thereafter, regulators all over the world
accepted the idea that competition in the telecommunications sector resulted in the
provision of better quality services to customers, more investment, and more innovations
(Intven et al., 2000). These reforms in the telecommunications sector led to more
investment, which then led to both an improvement in the quality of the services offered
and a lowering of the prices charged (Armstrong & Sappington, 2006; Wallsten, 2001).
The key areas of telecommunications reform were privatization, the creation of an
independent regulator, and competition (Li & Xu, 2004; Ofa, 2012; Wallsten, 2001,
2002; Ros, 1997). Although it might be too early to tell whether the telecommunications
reform within the Caribbean has been beneficial, there is evidence to suggest that the
process has not achieved the levels of efficiencies, even within the European Union
(Flacher, Jennequin & Ugur, 2009, Conclusion, para. 1). Flacher et al. (2009) suggested
that the process of reform has largely ignored the “complex set of issues such as
imperfect competition, imperfect information, and consequences that are likely to limit or
prevent the achievement of efficiency and welfare gains” (p. 1). Telecommunications
reform did not deal with the issues Flacher et al. discussed, and these issues are more
prominent in smaller countries that do not have the economies of scale compared to
larger, more developed countries.
The number of independent telecommunications regulators in the world has
grown. Wu (2004) analyzed the World Telecommunications Development Report and
found that there were 13 independent regulators in 1990 (p. 4). However, in 2004, there
were more than 100 established independent regulators, in order to meet obligations to
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the WTO (Wu, 2004). Many researchers agree that independent regulators are necessary
in order for countries to provide a degree of certainty to the sector (Levy & Spiller, 1994;
Stern &Trillas, 2002; Wallsten, 2003). However, the literature only deals with regulators
for large countries with large populations. For example, Brown, Stern, Tenenbaum, and
Gencer (2006) stated that the primary reason a country should implement and justify
economic regulation is if the regulation in question produces better sector outcomes. The
country must perform better after implementing the regulatory reforms (Brown et al.,
2006). Good regulatory systems encourage economic growth (Jalilian, Kirkpatrick,
Parker, & Centre on Regulation and Competition, 2006). Eberhard (2007) indicated that
part of the telecommunications reform process involves the establishment of independent
regulators. However, Eberhard also added that “mantras tend to substitute thinking – and
may not always fit all settings” (p. 4). Eberhard stated that the best outcome for a proper
regulatory framework is dependent on a country’s ability to commit the necessary
institutional resources to it, and “to select from a menu of regulatory options to create
hybrid models that best fit its own circumstances and challenges” (p. 1). In addition,
Eberhard stated that “designing and implementing legitimate, competent regulatory
institutions in developing countries will always be a dynamic challenge” (p. 1).
Developing countries will continue to create these regulatory institutions, with varying
degrees of independence, in order to meet their WTO obligations.
Telecommunications Reform in the Caribbean
Caribbean states have witnessed liberalization and competition growth in the
telecommunications sector since the year 2000. Prior to the opening up of this sector to
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new entrants, it was dominated by monopolizing companies that pitched their services to
the elites instead of the mass market (Galperin & Mariscal, 2007). Cable & Wireless
(C&W), a company operating within the British colonial framework, had exclusive rights
under the Caribbean constitutional arrangement to provide telecommunication services
across the majority of British Caribbean countries. National governments in those days
did not have the technical expertise to contest the requests forwarded by C&W, and the
perception developed that they rubber-stamped every proposal extended by the
company’s management (Favaro & Winter, 2008). The telecommunications operators
regulated themselves, with a modicum of national government involvement.
Formation of Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority
In addition to the pressure from the WTO, two events contributed towards the
formation of a regional regulatory body in the form of the ECTEL. Marpin
Telecommunications, getting the license to provide Internet services in Dominica, was
the first one. In the beginning, Marpin provided its Internet services through leased lines
acquired by C&W, but, in 1998, Marpin acquired an international gateway that bypassed
C&W’s network. This caused resentment within the C&W management, and they
decided to challenge Marpin’s move, citing their exclusive control over
telecommunication resources, outlined by the Dominican law. After receiving several
rulings in the lower judiciary, the case finally reached the highest court for all the East
Caribbean nations (i.e., the Privy Council of the United Kingdom). The council ruled in
favor of Marpin Telecommunications, stipulating that C&W’s monopoly was against the
constitutional rights of the citizens (Abraham, 2010).
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The second event that led to the regional unity required for the formation of a
strong regional regulator was the confrontation between the St. Lucian government and
C&W, in the year 2000. C&W made threats to withdraw to the St. Lucian government.
This resulted in a common regional reaction against the C&W management. The
governments of Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, and St. Kitts and
Nevis stated that if C&W left St. Lucia, then the company would be forced to leave their
territories as well.
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) played a role in the
formation of ECTEL. OECS’s joint program with the World Bank, called the OECS
Telecommunications Reform Project, helped pave the way for the creation of a regional
regulator that would allow the liberalization of the overall telecommunications sector.
ECTEL was created in May 2000, and it opened its headquarters in St. Lucia in 2002. It
encompasses five members of the OECS, and it has become the world’s first multilateral
telecom regulator (Plaidy et al., 2003). Each member state formulated the National
Telecommunications Regulatory Commissions (NTRCs) by enacting the
Telecommunication Acts. These NTRCs operate at national level, while ECTEL works at
the regional level (Minges, Cross, & Gray, 2004).
There are several benefits to having a multinational regulatory agency such as the
ECTEL: Martin and Sohail (2005) stated, that it allows the development of a regulatory
approach that can address “cross-cutting technical issues,” along with the provision of
“high-level technical expertise common to all the member states” (p. 63). Greater
investor confidence in the stability and objectivity of regulatory bodies will generate
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more private investment. Despite several advantages of regional cooperation, there is a
range of potential hurdles that can impede the integration process. These hurdles exist at
the regional and national levels, and they include deteriorating political will, changes in
integration strategies, technical lacunas, and national rivalries. Often, the integration
process is undermined, as national interests start taking precedence over regional ones.
This is especially true if member states are at varying levels of development and feel
obstructed by the requirements of fewer countries (Lewis, 2000).
The Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority’s role is divided between
the activities that it performs itself and the guidance it provides to contracting states. It is
responsible for several different tasks, such as developing and maintaining an integrated
radio plan, reviewing applications for licenses, designing and operating tender procedures
for individual licenses, and coordinating with other organizations (Tremolet, Shukla,
&Venton, 2004). Still, the bulk of its work is to provide guidance to contracting states
related to technical standards, policy, and licensing issues (Tremolet, 2007). Overall,
since ECTEL’s establishment, there has been a growth in competition in the mobile and
fixed-line markets, which has led to lowered prices and increased investment.
Jamaican Telecom Regulation and the Office of Utilities Regulation
The OUR was established by the Office of Utilities Regulation Act, issued by the
Jamaican government in order to regulate all major utilities in a collective manner. These
utilities include telecommunications, electricity, water/sewerage, and transportation.
Before that, C&W’s monopoly remained entrenched within Jamaican territory, especially
in respect of the wired networks. There was a backlog of nearly 217,000 requests for
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fixed-line telephone connections that C&W could not fulfill during the late 1990s.
Internet service providers started offering phone calls over the Internet, which challenged
C&W’s monopoly. Initially, C&W went into legal battle with the Jamaican government,
but subsequently agreed to an out-of-court settlement. This agreement allowed the
Jamaican government to promulgate the Telecommunication Act of 2000, replacing the
1893 Act (Roberts-Brown & Golding, 2013).
The Telecommunication Act of 2000 was instigated due to the WTO’s
international pressure, as the Jamaican government is a signatory to the WTO and is
bound by its decisions (Hillman & Braithwaite, 2004). This act helped to end C&W’s
monopoly in the telecommunications sector, which stretched over decades. The
Telecommunication Act of 2000 stipulated that entities in the telecommunications sector
can be held accountable by the OUR to improve overall efficiency and service delivery.
The enactment of the Fair Competition Act (FCA) in 1993 also helped with the
liberalization of the telecommunications sector. The FCA protects the interests of the
general public, through provisions directed against monopolistic tactics employed by the
utilities and other companies. These highly anticompetitive practices include price-fixing,
collusive tendering, and bid-rigging, all of which are harmful to the public interest
(Hillman & Braithwaite, 2004). Jamaica adopted a multisector approach for regulating
utilities through a single regulator. This approach is less costly compared with the
approach of having a regulator for every utility sector. All the technical and
administrative resources of the OUR are pooled, leading to cost reductions.
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In the initial years of regulation, the single-sector approach may be more helpful
in developing that regulator’s sector, but it can lead to regulatory capture due to increased
interaction with the regulated industry. Jamaica’s multisector approach helps in this
regard, as it checks misappropriations through closer scrutiny, reducing the chances of
partial treatment.
Caribbean Countries without Reform
Despite the numerous reforms that have taken place throughout various islands,
including the territories that are still controlled by the British, there are still a few island
countries that have made no changes towards telecommunications reform or their
regulatory frameworks. In Antigua and Barbuda, where the public utilities (water,
electricity, and telecommunications) are still controlled by the government (APUA,
2017), it has been challenging for them to introduce any kind of independent
telecommunications regulator. It has almost become an annual routine for the various
ministers of government to indicate that a change will occur, but, as of this writing, it is
still outstanding (Daily Observer, 2014). It must be noted that Antigua and Barbuda
introduced competition in the telecommunications sector via wireless, but the country has
not introduced a new framework to govern the sector.
The other country that, up until 2013, had not introduced an independent
telecommunications regulator was Bermuda (Bermuda Regulatory Authority, 2017).
Although it started the reform process back in 1986, the government still had direct
oversight of the telecommunications sector. However, like Antigua and Barbuda, it had
introduced competition in the sector, but delineated between the differing portions of
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telecommunications services. Although there could be Internet Service Providers (ISP),
they could not provide their own link to the home. A consumer in Bermuda would get
two distinct bills: one from the ISP and the other from the company that provided the link
between the consumer and the ISP.
Summary
Capture theory is used to explain the development, creation, and effectiveness of
the telecommunications regulatory institutions or framework. In developing countries, a
breakthrough in telecommunications is an opportunity for economic improvement. Social
and cultural impacts brought about by telecommunications services are being felt.
However, these advances can be threatened by the impact of regulatory capture (Stirton
& Lodge, 2002). Regulatory capture, if it occurs, can have a negative impact on the
telecoms sector. As Baudrier (2001) stated, capture of the regulator can occur due to
“poor bureaucratic norms and incentives, lack or asymmetry of information” (p. 6). Galal
and Nauriyal (1995) argued that regulatory regimes and the telecoms sector go hand in
hand. Galal and Nauriyal posited that the telephone service provider’s performance is
dependent on the credibility of the government, which in turn is dependent on certain
safeguards that include an independent regulator.
Regulatory capture theory also adds to the understanding of reforms in
telecommunications institutions. Richter (2015) asserted that regulatory capture
undermines public sector reforms, resulting in instability and mistrust by the public.
Corruption has been cited as one of the reasons why the economic capture of a country’s
regulatory agencies occurs. However, capture does not necessarily mean corruption
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(Schacklock & Galtung, 2016). One example of capture can be seen in the case when
Guyana’s Public Utilities Commission failed to grant the incumbent operator any rate
increases, even after 14 years, in spite of the obligation pursuant to the license of the
incumbent (Guyana Public Utilities Commission, 2015). However, the general elections
of the country were held at the same time. The Public Utilities Commission preferred to
lose credibility, rather than to embarrass the administration and have it be one of the
causes for them losing the election. The Commission later revised its position without
any further evidence and at the same incumbent’s request (Guyana Public Utilities
Commission, 2017).
Scholars have advocated for the creation and development of independent
regulatory reforms throughout the English-speaking Caribbean countries. There are
several factors that affect how scholars view regulation. These factors are not only
explained by using theoretical models, but also through the study of historical
evolutionary processes.
Because the majority of the island states are former colonies of Great Britain, they
have a tendency to mimic their former colonial master. Despite this tendency, there are
unique natural geographic and socioeconomic features that set them apart from each
other. Because the island states predominantly depended on agriculture, they were slow
to recognize the impact of ICTs and to adopt any telecommunications reform processes.
Therefore, moving from a monopoly-based telecommunications environment to a
competitive one required the external influence of the WTO. Although these countries
adopted WTO principles, they did this not to enhance their ICT sectors, but to increase
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and protect their own agricultural outputs, because the WTO could not protect their other
trade interests if they did not open up their telecommunications markets.
Once the English-speaking Island states of the Caribbean realized the benefits that
could be gained from implementing the WTO principles, many did so, because they had
already begun the reform process, starting with privatization. Soon after the Caribbean
countries began developing independent regulatory agencies, the WTO recognized that
both developing countries and SIDS needed special considerations regarding the
implementation of its rules. While some of these countries forged ahead with setting up
independent regulatory agencies, others slowed the process down or simply failed to set
them up, and instead chose to follow the WTO guidelines by ensuring the regulatory
entity was separated from the telecommunications sector by creating distinct, unrelated
regulatory ministries. As identified by Jordana, Levi-Faur, and Marin (2011), regulatory
agencies have grown and developed through an “global diffusion” process by changes
that have occurred in the bureaucracies, policy-making, and the roles of the state,
resulting in changes that are yet to be completely understood (Jordana et al., 2011, p. 19).
In the Eastern Caribbean (i.e., Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines), countries created the ECTEL treaty (2013). This is a
regulator similar to their Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. At the same time, they also
created a local regulator, the NTRC. The only country in the Eastern Caribbean that did
not sign the treaty and still remained a member of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
was Antigua and Barbuda. The only other country that did not create an independent
regulator at the time others in the region did so was Bermuda, but it did so in 2012
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(Bermuda Regulatory Authority, 2014). All the other Caribbean countries created single,
impartial, independent regulators.
A country’s decision to adopt a new telecommunications regulatory policy reform
or framework is based on several factors. Developing a telecommunications regulatory
policy is difficult, because social and cultural norms come into play, combined with
political will. In addition, what other countries are doing is important, and so too are the
wishes of the public (Berry & Berry, 1999). Developing states are under the influence of
the larger, more developed countries, because they have a stronghold on agencies such as
the WTO. SIDS, such as those of the English-speaking Caribbean, have difficulty
following these agencies’ policies. Countries that make up SIDS have not had a choice
with regards to independent telecommunications regulation; they have been forced to
adopt a regulatory model created by others. However, the regulatory theory discussed in
this literature also helps to explain telecommunications reforms and the speed with which
they are implemented.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the study variables and the choice of quantitative
methodology.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to discover the impact that the creation of
independent telecommunications regulators has on SIDs of the Caribbean. Scholars have
focused on the importance of regulators in general, but have not focused on regulators in
SIDS. As Ofa (2012) explained, the telecommunications reform of the small developing
island countries gained credibility once the countries signed on to the WTO, which
mandated the inclusion of independent regulators in the sector as part of
telecommunications reform (p. 23).
Wallsten (2002) found that telecommunications reform that included competition
and independent regulatory bodies had the greatest economic benefits to a country, even
more so than privatization and regulation (p. 6). Additionally, Galal and Nauriyal (1995),
Hoffman (2008), and Mohamad (2014) found that in some countries, telecommunications
reform was implemented, but in others, it failed. Scholars recognized that SIDS do not
necessarily need the same factors in place to have the same kind of economic growth that
the larger countries do. Researchers have not studied SIDS as they pertain to
telecommunications regulatory reform, and research on telecommunications regulatory
reform does not distinguish between larger states and SIDS. Dhaher (2011) stated,
telecommunications regulatory frameworks in large states do not take the
economic characteristics of small states under consideration, which resulted in
problems with regard to market structure and competition and a higher cost of
implementing regulations compared to their benefits. (p. 2).
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Additionally, Dhaher pointed out that both “lack of experience” and “weak institutional
experience” had an adverse effect on any reform (p. 2).
Technology is a determinant of growth. New technologies reduce the prices of
goods and services to which they are applied. They also lead to the creation of new
products. Consumers benefit from these improvements, regardless of whether they live in
rich or poor countries (Rodrik, 2018). Competition along with leapfrogging technologies
like mobile telephony, local wireless loops, and mobile banking all have potential impact
on economic development. The ability to access and adapt technologies enables social
inclusion for the poor to escape the economic stratification in lesser developed countries
(Warschuer, 2004, p. 8).
In order to answer the overarching question regarding the impact of independent
telecommunications regulatory bodies, I asked the following questions:
1. How are telecommunications infrastructure in fixed line services affected by
regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the
telecoms sector, GDP/income per capita and telephone tariffs?
H01: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms
sector, and telephone tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable fixed line
services.
H11: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms
sector, and telephone tariffs do affect the dependent variable fixed line services.
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2.

How are telecommunications infrastructure in cellular services affected by

the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the
telecoms sector, GDP/income per capita and telephone tariffs?
H02: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms
sector, and telephone tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable cellular
services.
H12: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms
sector, and telephone tariffs do affect the dependent variable cellular services.
3.

How are telecommunications infrastructure in universal services (i.e.,

fixed lines and cellular services) affected by the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, competition in the telecoms sector, GDP/income per
capita and telephone tariffs?
H03: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications
investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable universal services.
H13: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications
investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do affect the dependent variable universal services.
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4.

What is the relationship between prices in the telecoms sector (telephone

tariffs) and the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment,
competition in the telecoms sector, GDP/income per capita?
H04: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms
sector do not have any effect on the dependent variable prices.
H14: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms
sector do affect the dependent variable prices.
5.

What is the relationship between telecoms investment and the regulatory

regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and
GDP/income per capita?
H05: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms
sector do not have any effect on the dependent variable telecoms investment.
H15: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms
sector does affect the dependent variable telecoms investment.
6.

What is the relationship between broadband usage and the regulatory

regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and
GDP/income per capita?
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H06: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms
sector do not have any effect on the dependent variable broadband usage.
H16: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms
sector do affect the dependent variable broadband usage.
7.

What is the relationship between competition in telecoms sector and

regulatory regime, population, telecommunication prices, and GDP/income per capita?
H07: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP/income per capita.
H17: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP/income per capita.
Research Design
Scholars define the term independence in several ways; I, however, examined
purely statutory independence that is defined as “the operational separation of the
regulator from the government and from those it regulates” (Mohammed & Strobl, 2010,
p. 96). This definition is accepted throughout the telecommunications industry.
The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications defined an independent
regulator as an entity that is separate only from the incumbent operator. However,
according to Nikolinakos (2006), the European Open Network Provision Framework
Directive has a different definition. Independence is to “create seamless interoperability
of services between interconnected networks” (Nikolinakos, 2006, p. 50). The European
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Open Network informed its member states that, in retained ownership in
telecommunications services or networks, there must be a structural separation between
the entities providing such services and the national regulatory authority (Kirkham &
Swaminathan, 1996). Throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, whenever
governments use the term independent telecommunications regulator, they are referring
to a corporate body established through legislative process; therefore, the corporate body
fits both the WTO and the European Union recommendations.
In this study, I measured the impact of independent and nonindependent
regulators, tariffs, universal services, broadband usage, GDP per capita, and telecoms
investment and competition on various aspects of the telecommunications sector. The
hypothesis was that countries that do introduce an independent regulator and competition
into the telecommunications sector have performed better in terms of infrastructure
deployment (i.e., universal services), telecoms tariffs, and telecoms investment. Figure 1
shows how a country decides on a regulatory framework and its subsequent impact.
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Figure 1. A diagram of how countries choose a regulatory framework and the
framework’s subsequent impact.
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Governments adopt certain policies because states have a tendency to follow each
other, especially when they are ideologically similar (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, &
Peterson, 2004). However, the adoption of a policy is also based on the pressures the
government faces at any given time. Whether an English-speaking Caribbean country
adopts a particular telecommunications regulatory framework is determined by several
factors, including what its neighboring countries are doing and the perceived internal and
external pressures that it may be facing. The country has to decide whether it will
establish an independent or nonindependent regulator, which has implications on the
telecommunications sector and the economy. I employed a quantitative, experimental
design. This design was appropriate because of the research questions, essentially testing
the importance of the independent regulator and its impact on the telecommunications
sector as described by the telecommunications infrastructure (fixed and cellular services),
telecoms investment, and so forth.
Methodology
The methodological approach primarily included a cross-sectional, time-series
analysis to compare the countries that operate under differing regulatory frameworks.
This design was appropriate because as Sayrs (1989) suggested, “pooling is
useful…when length of the time series is abbreviated and/or the sample of cross-sections
is modest in size” (p. 7). The purpose of this approach was to measure the effects that
independent regulatory institutions, as previously defined, have on the
telecommunications sector in small English-speaking Caribbean countries and to attribute
any changes to the type of regulatory system in place. The sample of countries is small,
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yet encompasses all of the countries in the English-speaking Caribbean. These countries
are dissimilar with respect to factors such as their GDP or their income per capita and
their telecommunications sector.
The specification of the model for my econometric analysis is from the theory
described in Chapter 2.
Dependent variable=b0+b1*Independent regulator+b2*Competition+b3*other country
effects + error
Equation 1
In these equations, independent variables were tariffs, investments, and so forth.
There were three models to test the hypothesis of an independent regulator being
a necessary factor in telecoms infrastructure deployment (dependent variable). The first
model was where the telephones in services would be fixed lines in services. This has
been the standard model. However, the second model included only cellular service, and
the third model was a composite variable (i.e., the sum of cellular and fixed lines
services).
Log (Telephones in service)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory
regime)it + b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (telecoms investment)it + b5 log (income per capita)it
+ b6 (competition)it

+ε

Equation 2
The composite variable represented the level of telecommunications penetration
or the accessibility of telephones throughout the countries. It was the sum of the fixed
telephones in service and the amount of cellular subscribers.
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The next variable was the regulatory variable, which was a binary regressor. This
measured whether there was an independent regulator in the country or whether the
regulator is a part of a ministry (nonindependent). Generally, this measure indicated that
a greater level of penetration occurs with an independent regulator; hence, the coefficient
of the sign will be positive.
The tariff variable was one of the average prices for service relative to the other
countries. Although it may be difficult to create a single index, the ITU has created an
ICT price basket that I used as a proxy to develop this tariff variable. The ICT price
basket includes both fixed and mobile telephone and fixed broadband service (ICT Data
& Statistical Division, 2012). I expected that the coefficient of this variable will be
positively related to growth in the sector.
The other critical variable was the telecommunications regulator, which was
independent of any ministerial portfolio of the government. In the Caribbean, prior to the
creation of the regulator, the ministry had general oversight of the industry, and a
permanent secretary within the ministry oversaw operations while the minister generally
oversaw policies or critical and politically sensitive matters such as tariffs. Also, in the
Caribbean, there was no differentiation between functional or statutory independence
because such independence was already established via statute or legislative fiat for all
the countries that created a regulator. Although it may be possible to create degrees of
independence of countries based on some qualitative factors, doing so would result in an
arguable and controversial scale. Therefore, I made independence one-dimensional in
order to ensure a total capture of the nature of this variable. In using this approach, more
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refined issues of the regulatory design were not be captured (ie., a single regulator as
opposed to a commission of regulators could impact the telecommunications sector
differently). However, the variable was independence as defined by statute or
nonindependence, meaning it resides solely within the responsible ministry of the
government.
Another binary variable had to be introduced for the country of Monserrat
because of a volcano that destroyed half the island in 1995, and from which it has never
fully recovered.
The final variable, competition, was also another binary variable. This
measurement indicated when competition in the telecommunications sector was
introduced into the respective country.
There were also four other models that were employed to test the significance of
the independent regulator (IR); these were also be cross-sectional pooled time series
model. The models were as follows:
The first tested if prices (tariffs) in the telecoms sector are affected by IR from
theory.
Equation 3
Log (prices in the telecoms sector)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2
(regulatory regime)it + b3 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + b4
log (telecoms investment)it + b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (competition)it

+ε

The second model tested telecoms investment and IR.
Equation 4
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Log (telecoms investment)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory
regime)it + b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it +
b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (competition)it

+ε

The third model tested broadband usage and IR.
Equation 5
Log (Broadband usage)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory
regime)it + b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (telecoms investment)it + b5 log (income per capita)it
+ b6 (competition)it+b7 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + ε
The fourth and final model tested competition and IR.
Equation 6
Log (competition)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory
regime)it + b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it +
b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (telecoms investment)it

+ε

Data Description
The primary data analyzed for this study included panel data from the ITU, on 18
English speaking countries from the Caribbean and Latin American region, covering the
period from 1993 to 2012. Panel data, also referred to as longitudinal data or crosssectional time-series data, are a type of pooled data that may contain both cross-section
(i.e., data on one or more variables collected at a single point in time) and time series
(data that are collected over a time interval [ie., weekly, quarterly or annually]). For
example, if there are 10 years of annual data for 17 different countries, using panel data,
there would be 170 observations. According to Paul (n.d.), there are several reasons for
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using panel data including mitigating against the challenges of resulting from parameter
heterogeneity and selectivity bias:
1.

Because the panel data relate to factors such as individuals, firms, states,

and countries, over time, the presence of heterogeneity in these units is a natural
phenomenon. The techniques of panel data estimation take such heterogeneity into
account by allowing for individual variables.
2.

By combining time series of cross section observations, panel data give

“more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees
of freedom and more efficiency.”
3.

By studying the repeated cross section of observations, panel data are

better suited to study dynamics of change.
4.

Panel data can better detect and measure effects that cannot be observed in

pure cross section or time series data.
5.

Panel data enables researchers to study more complicated behavioral

models.
6.

By making data available for several thousand units, panel data minimize

the bias that might result when researchers aggregate individuals or firms into broad
aggregates. (pp. 1-2)
Analytical Framework
The number of mobile and fixed telephone lines was compared by groups based
on competition and IRs using independent samples to test to see whether there was a
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significant difference between these groups. In order to control for possible confounding
factors, and given the panel structure of the data, I fit the regression models in the form:
Equation 7

yit = α + xitβ + ui + εit
In this model, y was the dependent variable, xit was the vector of independent
(explanatory) variables, ui + ε it was the error term in which I had minimal interest. I
wanted estimates of β - parameter estimates vector. ui was the unit-specific (in this
case, state-specific) error term: it differed between units, but for any particular unit, its
value was constant. This error component captured all individual country effects that
were country-specific, but time-invariant (e.g., propensity of people to adopt innovations,
historical and institutional factors for countries that might influence telecommunication
market, etc.).
OLS regressions were estimated with country dummy variables among
independent variables so that each country’s unobserved influence on the dependent
variable was accounted for. It was important to include these country-specific effects to
avoid biased estimates of the key parameters of interest (the coefficients of competition
and independent regulator dummy variables).
Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich variance–covariance matrix
estimator) of the coefficients that are identical to those obtained by clustering on the
panel variable state were reported. Clustering on the panel variable produces an estimator
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that is robust to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and within-panel (serial) correlation
that is asymptotically equivalent to that proposed by Arellano (1987).
The fraction of error variance that was attributed to ui (i.e., to country-specific
effects) was also reported. The larger this proportion was, the higher the importance of
country-specific unobserved heterogeneity that was, however, accounted for by the fixed
effects model.
Double log specifications were used, common in related literature, leaving only
dummy variable untransformed. In logy = a+bx specification b is interpreted as follows:
“when x goes up by 1, y increases by (exp(b)-1)*100%”.
Essentially, two different approaches–the fixed effects model or the random
effects model–were applicable to this research. The model a researcher selects depends
on the available data and his or her belief about the models. For example, Kennedy
(1998) argued that fixed and random effects models are usually used “when the number
of cross-sectional units is large and the number of time periods over which those units are
observed is small” (p. 231). However, as to the exact choice of models, Clark and Lizner
(2012) and Borenstein et al. (2009) stated that how a researcher determines which model
is best remains unclear because scholars give contradictory advice (p. 29). If a researcher
is unsure of what model to use, he or she should administer the recommended Hausman
specification test in order to “test for orthogonality of the common effects and the
regressors” (Greene, 2008, p. 208). However, both Greene (2008) and Clark and Lizner
(2012) agreed that the Hausman test is not a reliable tool for identifying bias nor does it
give any further information as to the balance of bias and variance between the two
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modelling approaches. However, it is the least complicated of the tests than can be run to
give the experimenter some guidance.
According to Borenstein et al. (2009) scholars generally use the fixed-effect
model when “all studies in the analysis are functionally identical and the goal is to
compute the common effect size for the identified population, and not to generalize to
other populations” (p. 83). Hsiao (2003) also suggested that a fixed-effects model is best
when the observations in an experiment are not randomly sampled but are all available
and used. The use of the fixed effects is also based on the belief or assumption that the
omitted variables effects are correlated with the variables that are included within the
equation (Greene, 2008).
A fixed model includes dummy variables within the equation to control for both
the unobservable and observable differences that could reduce the omitted variable bias.
Simultaneously, changes in time in the unobservable variables should not correlate with
the included variables; if so, then the omitted variable bias would still be present. The
impact of each of the predictor variables is assumed to be exact across all the groups, and
the regression equation reports only the average of the within-group effects. Finally, in
order for the fixed-effects model to be successful,
each individual in the sample must have two or more measurements on the same
dependent variable, and [on] at least some of the individuals in the sample, the
values of the independent variable(s) of interest must be different on at least two
of the measurement occasions. (Allison, 2005, p. 2)
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Interaction of Variables
The interaction of variables sometimes occurs whenever there is a combined
effect on the dependent variable. The effect of one policy variable could change
whenever it is implemented at the same time as another policy. In this study, the
dependent variables were the implementation of an IR and the introduction of
competition into the telecommunications sector, and the two were dummy variables. If
these two variables interacted with each other, it would have a significant implication and
it would be difficult to determine how best to interpret the results. A two-way interaction
term needed to be created to test the interaction of both the IR and competition. An Fstatistic test should be undertaken to determine if the coefficients on the interaction terms
together equal 0. The null hypothesis was that if there is no difference between the
interaction variables, the test will result in a significant F-statistic. This is applicable to
the regression coefficients, which is generally in the parameter estimates table, and not to
the analysis of variance (ANOVA) table, although “the same principles apply to the
interpretation of the results in the ANOVA” (Taylor, 2007, p. 1).
Policy makers, while tending to be conservative by nature, usually try to meet a
series of social objectives (for example, allowing cross subsidies and universal service) in
order to maximize social welfare for the population. Policy makers expect the
introduction of both competition and the IR will increase the efficiency of service, lower
prices, and increase universal service. Therefore, I expected that the interaction of these
two variables will have a positive impact on the telecommunications services in general.
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Missing Data
Generally, research is limited by data that are available, and this reality is true for
developing countries. Comparable data were not available for all the variables and all the
countries. To compensate for the missing data, contact was made with the individual
governments and regulatory bodies to acquire the required information. However, in the
instances where governments or private entities could not provide data, the model was
not be affected. I analyzed the panel as unbalanced and assumed the missing data were
random; therefore, the results can still be generalized.
Threats to Validity
Internal validity refers to the confidence a scholar has in the experiment and that
the relationship between the variables that was established is indeed causal (Shuttleworth,
2009). Although it is not possible to completely eliminate threats to internal validity, a
researcher can minimize those threats. Trochim and Donnelly (2007) suggested that three
conditions must be met before a scholar can conclude that there exists “a cause and
relationship” (p. 232). These conditions are covariation, temporal precedence, and no
plausible alternative explanations (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). In establishing that there
is no other explanation that can be concluded, telecommunications are one of those
utilities that is subject to technological innovation. During the last decade, the industry
has evolved from wired to wireless platforms, which required significant technological
shifts (ITU, 2004). Tullock, Seldon, and Brady (2005) suggested that shifts are also a
result of factors including legislative and technological changes. However, although there
may be some conflating of results with technology, the advent of an IR may contain the
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impact. I assumed that technological changes were constant across all the examined
countries because the same telecommunications company exists in nearly all of the
examined countries. Consequently, the impact of the causal effect of technology on the
industry could be safely eliminated. The need to establish legislation and implement
legislative changes is responsible for the creation of IRs. With IRs, changes in legislation
have little to no impact. Hence, I am confident that this investigation was internally
consistent and valid.
External validity is the ability to generalize the results of the findings (Trochim &
Donnelly, 2007). The data from this investigation concerned only English-speaking
countries of the Caribbean; as such, the data should not be used to predict outcomes for
other jurisdictions. Thus, I did not claim external validity. There are too many other
socioeconomic and cultural differences that could have an impact on other countries’
results.
Ethical Procedures
The data that were obtained were available from public sources including Internet
sites, regulatory institutions, and companies that collect the data. I did not imperil the
privacy, safety and welfare rights of any person from institutions that provided me with
the information. The same information could be obtained from the various institutions
upon request. The data obtained may be manipulated in ways such as being aggregated to
address the questions in the study. The data were archived on a personal computer and
were publicly accessible. There were no human subjects that were involved in the
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quantitative research design. I ensure that I received institutional review board approval
before proceeding with study.
Summary
In this chapter, I introduced the theoretical framework and the research design the
analysis was built on, the policy variables, and the description of the various variables
that were used in the analysis. I outlined the relationship between the IR/independent
framework and various elements generally associated with the development of the
telecoms sector, and specifically in the English-speaking Caribbean. The theoretical
framework in which the relationship of the regulator was examined was capture theory. I
also described the data and the inherent drawbacks of using said data. In addition, I
explained the methodology of cross-sectional pooled fixed-effects model and the
argument in support of this model. Based on the information presented, I chose the
correct econometric analysis and technique, and the research design is adequate to answer
the research questions.
In Chapter 4, I will present the results of the panel data models along with all the
statistical analysis performed.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the quantitative study. I
assessed the impact of an IR or framework on the telecommunications sector of the
English-speaking Caribbean. There were seven questions that were used to make a
determination about the impact of the independent regulator and they are as follows:
1.

How are telecommunications infrastructure in fixed line services affected

by regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the
telecoms sector, GDP and telephone tariffs?
H01: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable fixed line services.
H11: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do affect the dependent variable fixed line services.
2.

How are telecommunications infrastructure in cellular services affected by

the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the
telecoms sector, GDP and telephone tariffs?
H02: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable cellular services.
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H12: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone
tariffs do affect the dependent variable cellular services.
3.

How are telecommunications infrastructure in universal services (i.e.,

fixed lines and cellular services) affected by the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, competition in the telecoms sector, GDP and telephone
tariffs?
H03: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications
investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone tariffs do not have
any effect on the dependent variable universal services.
H13: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications
investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone tariffs do affect the
dependent variable universal services.
4.

What is the relationship between prices in the telecoms sector (telephone

tariffs) and the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment,
competition in the telecoms sector, GDP?
H04: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not
have any effect on the dependent variable prices.
H14: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do affect
the dependent variable prices.
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5.

What is the relationship between telecoms investment and the regulatory

regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and
GDP?
H05: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not
have any effect on the dependent variable telecoms investment.
H15: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector does affect
the dependent variable telecoms investment.
6.

What is the relationship between broadband usage and the regulatory

regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and
GDP?
H06: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not
have any effect on the dependent variable broadband usage.
H16: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population,
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do affect
the dependent variable broadband usage.
7.

What is the relationship between competition in telecoms sector and

regulatory regime, population, telecommunication prices, and GDP?
H07: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP.
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H17: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP.
Data Collection
The data were collected and analyzed as indicated in Chapter 3. The dependent
variables were fixed lines, cellular lines, a universal service (i.e., summary of both
cellular and fixed lines), prices of the telecoms services, telecoms investment, broadband
usage, and competition, which are all presented and summarized in the table below.
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Table 2
Variables Names, Characteristics and Source of the Data
Variable Name

Number of
Values
18

Number of
missing values
0

20

0

GDP in US dollar, constant 2010 prices

360

0

UN Data

GDP per capita

360

0

UN Data

Population

Population of Country

359

1

ITU

Fixed_Tel

Number of Main telephone lines (fixed lines) in
operation
Number of Main telephone lines (fixed lines) in
operation per 100 persons
Residential telephone connection charge (US$)

341

19

ITU

341

19

ITU

211

149

ITU

Residential monthly telephone subscription (US$)

219

141

ITU

State

Variable Description
Name of Country

Year
GDP_USD
GDP_Capita

Fixed_Tel_100
Fixed_Install
Fixed_Sub
Mobile_Tel
Mobile_Tel_100
Mobile_Install

Source

Number of mobile telephones in operation

317

43

ITU

Number of mobile telephones in operation per 100
persons
Mobile cellular connection charge (US$)

317

43

ITU

183

177

ITU

Mobile_Sub

Mobile cellular monthly subscription (US$)

168

192

ITU

Mobile_Min

215

145

ITU

343

17

ITU

Internet_100

Mobile cellular – price of 3-minute local call (peak –
US$)
Total telephone subscribers (includes fixed and
mobile)
Number of internet users per 100 persons

274

86

ITU

Total_Invest

Total annual investment in telecom (US$)

111

249

ITU

360

0

360

0

360

0

360

0

Total_Sub

Regulator

Binary variable indicating the presence of an
independent regulator
Regulator_Lag
Binary variable indicating the presence of an
independent regulator at lag one
Competition
Binary variable indicating the presence of
competition
Volcano
Binary variable indicating effects of a volcano
present
Note. *ITU = International Telecommunication Union

To compensate for the largeness of some of my variables, relative to others in the
equations, I made a log-log transformation for each of the equations.
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Results
I present the results of each of the equations in the order of the questions. A
transformation of the data occurred using a log-log equation that helped in decreasing the
variability and have it conform more closely to a normal type distribution. For Research
Question 1, Tables 3 and 4 present the model.
Equation 7
Log (fixed_tel)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulator)it + b3 log
(fixed_install)it + b4 log (fixed_sub)it + b5 log (total_invest)it + b6 log (GDP_ capita)it +
b7 (competition)it + ε
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Table 3
Model 1
Variable
Intercept

Estimate
-3.326**

Std Error
5.683

t-value
-5.899

Pr (>|t|)
7.83

Population

5.199**

1.048

4.961

1.50

Regulator

2.749**

1.220

2.253

0.030094

Fixed Install

9.574**

3.738

2.561

0.014514

-3.202**

1.560e+04

-2.052

0.047059

-3.301

6.513

-0.507

0.615151

2.937**

5.223

5.625

1.86

1.118

1.457

0.767

0.447884

Price
Fixed_Sub
Total_Invest
GDP
Competition

Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 0.21497, P-Value <0.0001,** significant
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Table 4
Model 1 Multicollinearity Test
Variable
Population

VIF
1.466209**

Regulator

6.545489**

Fixed_Install

3.685174**

Fixed_Sub

4.752718**

Total_Invest

8.622352**

GDP

4.517927**

Competition

7.308518**

Note. ** significant
The residual standard error: 19900 on 38 degrees of freedom the adjusted R-squ
ared: 0.9801,F-statistic: 103.5 on 35 and 38 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
It must be noted that the null hypothesis was rejected. Penn State Science
(2018) stated,
The variance inflation factors for a regression model measures the variance of
the estimated regression coefficient bk is ‘inflated’ by the existence of correlation
among the predictor variables in the model. A VIF of 1 means that there is no
correlation among the kth predictor and the remaining predictor variables, and
hence the variance of bk is not inflated at all. The general rule of thumb is that
VIFs exceeding 4 warrant further investigation, while VIFs exceeding 10 are
signs of serious multicollinearity requiring correction. (p. 8)
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Based on the model results, the independent variables were highly collinear with
each other. Although this would present an issue if the model was being used for
forecasting, the inclusion of variables tended to follow each other, such as income per
capita and population and competition and the introduction of the regulator. The
multicollinearity would not necessarily have any adverse effect and can be ignored. For
Research Question 2, Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the model.
Equation 8
Log (mobile_tel)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory regime)it
+ b3 log (mobile_install)it b4 log (mobile_min)it +b5 log (mobile_sub)it + b6 log
(total_invest)it + b7 log (GDP_capita)it + b8 (competition)it + ε
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Table 5
Model 2
Variable

Estimate

Std Error

t-value

Pr (>|t|)

Intercept

-1.750

6.187

-2.828

0.013413

Population

4.502**

1.312

3.432

0.004046

Regulator

9.105

1.441

0.430

0.673534

Mobile_Install

9.105

1.441

0.632

0.537707

Mobile_Sub

-7.611

4.388

-1.734

0.104812

Mobile_Min

-1.458e+01

8.206

1.776

0.097411

1.725**

8.576

2.011

0.063952

7.445

3.509

0.212

0.835021

GDP
Competition

Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 0.78617, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant
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Table 6
Model 2 Multicollinearity Test
Variable
Population

VIF
1.449616**

Regulator

1.218196**

Mobile_Install

8.404583**

Mobile_Sub

5.321162**

Mobile_Min

2.345336**

Total_Invest

5.962430**

GDP

8.605018**

Competition
Note. ** significant

1.309294**

The residual standard error: 2.032 on 14 degrees of freedom, the adjusted R-squared: 0.98
29, F-statistic: 89.31 on 26 and 14 DF, p-value: 1.313e-11
It must be noted that the null hypothesis was accepted. For Research Question 3, Tables 7
and 8 show the results.
Equation 9
Log (total_tel)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulator)it + b3 log
(fixed_install)it + b4 log (fixed_sub)it + b5 log (mobile_install)it + b6 log
(mobile_min)it +b7 log (mobile_sub)it + b8 log (telecoms investment)it + b9 log (GDP per
capita)it + b10 (competition)it + ε
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Table 7
Model 3
Variable
Intercept

Estimate
2.956

Std Error
1.124

t-value
2.631

Pr (>|t|)
0.02514

Population

9.827**

1.573

6.249

9.52

Regulator

-8.534

1.996

-0.428

0.67798

Fixed Install Price -9.601**

1.209

-7.943

1.25

Mobile_Install

-7.482**

1.015

-7.371

2.39

Mobile_subs

1.308**

3.816

3.427

0.00647

Mobile_min

1.109

6.834

1.623

0.13558

Total_Invest

6.547

1.474

0.444

0.66641

GDP

3.347

8.625

.388

0.70608

Competition

2.024

2.900

.698

0.50107

Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 0.25991, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant
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Table 8
Model 3 Multicollinearity Test
Variable

VIF

Population

5.090**

Regulator

2.081

Fixed_Install

2.415

Fixed_Sub

7.312**

Mobile_Install

1.228

Mobile_Sub

1.043

Mobile_Min

4.375

Total_Invest

7.506**

GDP

2.581

Competition

2.768

Note. ** significant
The residual standard error: 11510 on 10 degrees of freedom, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9976
F-statistic: 573.7 on 28 and 10 DF, p-value: 7.93e-13
It must be noted that the null hypothesis must be accepted.
For Research Question 4, Tables 9 through 11 show the results.
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Equation 10
Log (prices in the telecoms sector)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2
(regulatory regime)it + b3 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + b4
log (telecoms investment)it + b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (competition)it

+ ε4a.

This model created a new price variable that was intended to broadly represent
prices for fixed telephone lines. Monthly price of subscription was added to the cost of
installation.
Table 9
Model 4a
Variable
Intercept

Estimate
2.380

Std Error
6.777

t-value
3.512

Pr (>|t|)
0.001166

Population

6.364

9.445

0.674

0.504501

Regulator

3.826**

1.399

2.736

0.009408

Mobile_Tel

-2.151**

5.064

-4.247

0.000135

Fixed_Tel

-7.404**

1.658

-4.466

6.92

-2.037

7.299

-0.279

0.7817

GDP

1.582**

7.202

2.196

0.034265

Competition

4.545**

1.617

2.811

0.007764

Total_invest

Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 1.09, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant
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Table 10
Model 4a Multicollinearity Test
Variable

VIF

Population

9.900**

Regulator

7.148**

Mobile_Tel

3.817

Fixed_Tel

8.359**

Total_Invest

9.001**

GDP

7.142**

Competition

7.476**

Note. ** significant

The residual standard error: 2.182 on 38 degrees of freedom, adjusted R-squared: 0.9978
and the F-statistic: 961.9 on 35 and 38 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. The null hypothesis must
be rejected.
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Table 11
8 Model 4b
Variable
Intercept

Estimate
-1.459

Std Error
6.695

t-value
-2.179

Pr (>|t|)
0.03545

Population

1.826

1.241

1.471

0.1494

Regulator

1.564

1.783

0.877

0.38575

Mobile_Tel

-6.542

3.452

-1.895

0.06549

Fixed_Tel

-1.451

1.894

-0.766

0.44833

Total_invest

-8.2392

1.046

-0.788

0.43574

GDP

1.784**

7.65

2.332

0.02495

Competition

3.265

1.736

1.881

0.06749

Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 0.86472, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant
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Table 12
9 Model 4b Multicollinearity Test
Variable

VIF

Population

1.309110

Regulator

9.109**

Mobile_Tel
Fixed_Tel

3.989
7.484**

Total_Invest

1.343

GDP

8.150**

Competition

7.994**

Note. ** significant

The residual standard error: 0.2506 on 39 degrees of freedom, adjusted R-squared: 0.908
5, F-statistic: 22 on 35 and 39 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
The null hypothesis must be accepted.
For Research Question 5, Tables 12 and 13 show the results.
Equation 11
Log (telecoms investment)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory
regime)it + b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it +
b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (competition)it

+ε
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Table 12
10 Model 5
Variable
Intercept

Estimate
2.272

Std Error
1.689

t-value
1.345

Pr (>|t|)
0.2016

Population

3.631

3.135

1.158

0.2676

Regulator

3.300

2.853

1.157

0.2682

Fixed Price

3.946

2.828

1.396

0.1862

-1.349**

5.346

-2.523

0.0255

Total_subs

-1.740

9.741

-1.786

0.0974

GDP

1.335

3.175

1.118

0.2386

Competition

3.552

3.175

-0.588

0.5665

Mobile_Price

Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 0.70479, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant
Table 13
11 Model 5 Multicollinearity Test
Variable

VIF

Population

9.409**

Regulator

5.877**

Fixed_Price

4.663**

Total_Sub

1.809

GDP

4.113**

Competition

6.536**

Note. ** significant
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From the model the residual standard error is 0.2607 on 13 degrees of freedom.
The adjusted R-square is .9436 and the F-statistic is 26.42 with the p-value 1.482e-07.
The null hypothesis must be accepted.
For Research Question 6, Tables 14 and 15 show the results.
Equation 12
Log (Broadband usage)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory
regime)it + b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (telecoms investment)it + b5 log (income per capita)it
+ b6 (competition)it+b7 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + ε
Table 14
12 Model 6
Variable

Estimate

Std Error

t-value

Pr (>|t|)

Intercept

-3.134

1.196

-2.621

0.03062

Population

-8.599

1.716

-0.501

0.62976

Regulator

-1.623

3.238

-0.501

0.62971

Fixed Price

2.090**

4.657

4.488

0.00204

Mobile_Price

4.410

8.562

0.515

0.62045

Total_Invest

1.990

2.696

0.738

0.48156

GDP

1.474

1.439

1.025

0.33556

Competition

-4.176

3.617

-1.155

0.28152

Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 1.0103, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant
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Table 15
13 Model 6 Multicollinearity Test
Variable

VIF

Population

7.316353

Regulator

5.096912

Fixed_Price

2.043038

Total_Invest

1.228998

GDP

5.329163

Competition

7.136291

** significant
From the model, the residual standard error is 2.386 on 8 degrees of freedom. The
adjusted R-square is .9801 and the F-statistic is 66.53 with the p-value 8.069e-07.
For Research Question 7, Tables 16 and 17 show the results.
Equation 13
Log (competition)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory regime)it
+ b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + b5 log
(income per capita)it + b6log (telecoms investment)it

+ε

This model regression was a deviation from the standard pooled time series
model, which was used to assess the other independent variables. The type of regression
being done was a logistic regression. The reason for this deviation was that the dependent
variable competition was a binary variable. It was 0 when no competition was within the
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telecommunications sector at the time or it was 1 whenever competition entered the
specific market.

Table 16
14 Model 7
Variable
Estimate
Std Error
Z value
Pr ( > |z| )
Intercept
8.643
2.17
0
1
Population
1.351
3.83
0
1
Regulator
-5.773
3.60
0
1
Fixed_Price
-7.415
3.50
0
1
Mobile_Price
5.908
7.09
0
1
Total_Invest
3.683
3.08
0
1
GDP
-7.170
2.26
0
1
Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 0.25991, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant
Table 17
15 Model 7 Multicollinearity Test
Variable

VIF

Population

2.081

Regulator

2.415

Fixed_Price

7.312**

Mobile_Price

1.228

Total_Invest

1.043

GDP
Note. ** significant

4.375**
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From the R output presented above, the call function indicated the options
specified while running the model in R. The distribution of the deviance residuals was
also summarized to have minimum value of -0.00000613 and maximum value of
0.00000681 individual cases used in the model.
The subsequent table summarizes the coefficient and test of significance which
made use of the standard errors, the z-statistic and associated p-values.
From the model, it can be observed that all of the parameters under study (IR,
population, telecommunication prices, telecoms investment, and GDP/income per capita)
have significant effect on competition in telecommunication studies. The logistic
regression coefficients estimated the change in log odds of the outcome variable
competition in telecommunication industry for a one unit increase in any of the predictor
variables. Due to the insignificance of the model parameters, the model was considered to
be invalid when predicting relationship between competition in telecommunication sector
and IR, population, telecommunication prices, telecoms investment, and GDP.
Summary
The research results were mixed for the relationship between various aspects of
the telecoms sector within the Caribbean and the IR. I found that the regulator was
influential in the amount of subscribers for fixed lines, but that did not hold true for
cellular subscribers or even for overall subscribers (that is the sum of fixed and cellular
subscribers). I found that the regulator plays a role in prices for fixed services, but not for
cellular service. Additionally, both broadband usage and Telecoms investment did not
seem to be affected by any role played by the regulator. As for competition in the
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telecoms sector, there did appear to be a relationship between competition and the
regulator, but that relationship may be as per the design of the variables, hence difficult to
interpret. Both the regulator and competition were setup as two dummy variables.
In Chapter 5, I will address a discussion and interpretation of these research
findings. Finally, the limitations to the research, along with recommendations for possible
additional study, will be discussed and some positive conclusions will be made for social
change.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine if the English-speaking
Caribbean has same telecommunications regulatory institutions as larger countries. I used
a cross-sectional, time series analysis to see whether independent variables, especially
that of the IR, were related to the dependent variables in the telecoms sector, such as
prices, growth and investment in the sector, and competition. I found that there was no
relationship between the IR and mobile growth, telecoms investment, broadband growth,
and competition. I will provide an interpretation of these research findings. Additionally,
consideration will be given to the implications of the research for positive social changes
and suggestions and recommendations made for action and continued research.
Interpretation of Findings
The findings of the quantitative research project extended the knowledge in the
discipline of telecommunications regulation in the small English-speaking countries of
the Caribbean. I demonstrated that there were no relationships existing in which
regulators typically have control in larger developed countries. As was pointed out by
Reynolds (2014),
having de facto independent bodies to oversee mergers, licences, and spectrum
management, does not assure regulatory independence. Jamaica’s legislation still
empowers the Minister to make decisions regarding licence approval, a process
which does not allow for the standard of regulatory independence. (p. 11)
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The systems of government and regulatory institutions in Jamaica are similar if not the
same as the other English-speaking Caribbean countries as they are based on the
Commonwealth legal system. The minister or the political directorate are the ones who
generally direct the regulatory institutions.
Regulatory capture may not be the only reason why the IR variable was
insignificant in several questions such as mobile infrastructure, telecoms investment, and
telecoms pricing. From a legislative standpoint, the telecommunications IRs in the
English-speaking Caribbean make them susceptible to regulatory capture. Although
capture is rarely associated with governments, it does occur. Mitnick (2011) identified
this as relational capture. However, the other two types of capture that could occur in
these developing countries are individual and functional capture. Even the most perceived
independent of the telecommunications regulators in the Caribbean (i.e., the Office of
Utility Regulation) has recently been restructured to accommodate the thinking of the
government by creating the equivalent of a board. The other major regulatory body that is
the ECTEL has two boards that it reports to. The first level of reporting is the board of
directors, all whom are appointed by ministers of the respective countries, and the second
is the Council of Ministers that is another board but this one is made up of the ministers
(Ectel’s Treaty).
SIDs have challenges that are inherent because of their size, as Ofa (2012) pointed
out. Throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, the majority of the heads of these
regulatory organizations were previously from the institutions that they now regulate.
Additionally, because of the size of these small countries, there is a lack of or minimal
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industry and commerce; hence, professional jobs are not easily obtainable. In the country
of Guyana, the incumbent operator was refused a rate increase. The incumbent telephone
operator was refused because the increase was called for during the same year an election
was called, and the regulator could not afford to be perceived as taking sides either for or
against the government. After the elections, the same application without any changes
was resubmitted to the regulatory body, and a major rate increase was granted.
Regulatory bodies have a deficiency in terms of their operations. There are
generally no formal ways to lobby a regulator, and the thinking of many of the regulatory
institutions is unknown as no formal consultative documents are issued, so that operators
and consumers can make a determination as to the thinking of the regulator in certain
matters. Nor is there a formal process for comments to be made by any interested parties
in the decisions of these regulators. This leaves the regulator open and susceptible to the
other forms of capture. In Anguilla, the regulator consisted of himself and one support
staff. The regulatory bodies are evolving, and most try to have at least one engineer, one
consumer advocate, and the regulator who would be responsible for making the
regulatory decisions. Additionally, most of the regulators studied have no rules outlining
ex parte discussions; hence, the lack of transparency can cause capture of the regulator.
Finally, the socioeconomic structure of the English-speaking Caribbean, which is a small
population, makes it difficult for varying degrees of capture not to occur.
Limitations of Study
The limitations of this study were as discussed in Chapter 1. There are limitations
when using pooled time series regression analysis. In addition, the use of a fixed effects
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model that does not allow for the control of variables that changes over time was a
limitation. I did compensate for any omitted variable bias by measuring for changes that
may occur across time. If the unobservables are not time invariant, then there still could
be a problem with omitted variable bias. All of the variance inflation factors indicated a
high degree of collinearity of the variables; maybe there should be some multicollinearity
correction, and each of the variables significance should be checked individually.
Another challenge I had encountered was getting the verifiable data, as some of my
variables had many missing values.
Recommendations
The research that this project focused on was narrowly defined. I examined only
the developing countries of the English-speaking Caribbean and the effects of those
countries that created an independent telecommunications regulatory institution had on
various aspects of the telecommunications sector. Possible research questions involving
differing and various parameters were left unanswered. SIDs are rarely studied, as there
are few resources. However, this allows for numerous research possibilities, of which
there are several recommendations for consideration here.
I determined that there must be a difference between small and large and
developed and developing countries because the literature supported that difference. In
addition, I also found that a difference existed as to the impact of the telecoms regulatory
institutions on the telecoms sector. However, there could also still be a difference
between countries that are considered overseas territories (OTs) such as Anguilla, Turks,
and Caicos Islands and those that are independent countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad

109
and Tobago. OTs, while generally self-governing, do have a representative of the Queen,
usually a governor whose responsibility is international affairs and economic issues.
Telecommunications is considered both an economic issue with some degree of
international affairs associated with it. Additionally, these OTs are also much smaller in
population than their independent brethren with Bermuda being the largest at 69,000 and
Montserrat with just over 5,000. These numbers stand in contrast when compared with
Jamaica with a population just shy of 3 million persons.
A possible area of research is an examination of the degree of independence that
may exist between the regulatory bodies. Those regulatory institutions with more
independence could be having more of an effect on the telecommunications sector than
what is being observed in this study. There was a difference between formal
independence of a regulator that is pursuant to the legislation and a de facto
independence, the latter being so much more difficult to measure.
Another potential area of study is in the size and type of regulator to determine if
there is a difference between those regulatory institutions that are multisector or single
sector focused. Multisector focused regulators for small developing countries would be
able to make use of economies of scale and scope. Instead of having an economist
focused on a single sector, that same person could be used to focus on the electricity and
water sector.
Implications for Positive Social Change
There is the potential of additional economic growth that would result in a
positive social change with the regulation of the telecommunications sector. As I have
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shown, the relationship has varying strengths between the independent telecoms regulator
and the telecoms sector. However, in some areas where in larger countries regulators take
the lead, the regulators in the small developing countries of the English-speaking
Caribbean play a minimal role.
Regulation is generally considered one of the primary development tools for a
government to employ to extract value from any particular sector. This works in
conjunction with both policy and sector development. Policy tends to be broad-brush
national initiatives, while sector development is more practical interventions for that
sector. Regulation as the tool should be bringing market efficiency and customer
safeguards. This can be seen in the telecoms regulators (i.e., independent or not) before
competition was prevalent and their primary duty was to ensure that a monopoly operator
did not charge monopoly rents. In addition, price regulation telecoms regulators that
includes management of the spectrum ensures that assignment and allocation is done
efficiently and fairly.
In developed countries where telecoms regulators are most independent, they
have had their decisions legislatively reversed. Positive social change could be a
discussion to make a demarcation and clarification of where the portfolio responsible
minister or government powers begin and end, and those of the regulators so that there is
no blurring of the lines of responsibility. A key is to ensure regulators have autonomy in
certain areas exclusively; smaller developing countries have different structures and
should not imposed on to adopt ideas/structures of larger countries, cost of setting up,
design the regulatory institution to get maximum autonomy in areas designated.
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Legislation must be clear to minimize any overlap between policy makers and the
regulators, hence avoiding confusion as to their respective roles. The OUR lawsuit
brought against the portfolio minister indicated that the minister did overstep his bounds,
as per the legislation.
Another area for positive social change is to improve the transparency of
information that flows between operators, regulators, government (i.e., policy makers)
and the consumers and or consumer advocates. This includes the regulator being mindful
of competitive information. Rules governing the flow of information between participants
in the marketplace would help to limit or minimize even the perception of capture that
could occur with regulators.
Conclusion
Telecoms sector regulation in the English-speaking Caribbean is politically driven
and is impacted by the policy makers’ perception and external influences of where their
respective markets should be at any given time. This causes the role of policy and
regulation to be intertwined. However, although it may be that some degree of capture
will always exist in the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean because of small
populations and the socioeconomic make up, it can be constrained. It is important for IRs
to have credibility; this is especially true in the eyes of external institutions such as the
World Bank. Evidence-based policies that are tailored to the country will come to
supersede the general “one-size fits all” policy that currently obtains in the Englishspeaking Caribbean.
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